Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 60 | Issue 6

Article 1

11-2007

The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice
Owen D. Jones
Paul H. Robinson
Robert Kurzban

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Owen D. Jones, Paul H. Robinson, and Robert Kurzban, The Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 1633
(2019)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol60/iss6/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by
an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 60

NOVEMBER 2007

NUMBER 6

The Origins of
Shared Intuitions of Justice
Paul H. Robinson,*Robert Kurzban,**and Owen D. Jones***
1.
II.

THE PUZZLE: SHARED INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE .................. 1634
AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION ...................................... 1639

A.

B.
C.
D.

The Expression of Genes .........................................
Genetic Influences versus Genetic
1.
D eterm inism ................................................
2.
The Genetic Code as a Recipe for
D evelopm ent ................................................
Evolution as a Process of Solving Survival
P roblems .................................................................
The Evolution of General Moral and Proto-Legal
S entim ents ..............................................................
The Evolution of Intuitions of Justice ....................
Human Sociality and the Predisposition
1.
to Acquire Shared Intuitions of Justice ......
2.
Intuitions of Justice as Generating
Benefits for Individuals ...............................

1639
1640
1641
1643
1644

1646
1646
1649

Colin S. Diver Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The authors are indebted
to Michael Orchowski, Alex Shaw, Peter DeScioli, Lindsay Suttenberg, Martha K. Presley, Shang
Cao, and Susan Eisenberg for invaluable research assistance.
..
Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania.
... Professor of Law & Professor of Biological Sciences, Vanderbilt University; Co-Director,
Network on Decision Making, MacArthur Foundation Law and Neuroscience Project.

1633

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

1634

III.

EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY
EXPLANATION ..................................................................... 1654

A.
B.
C.

D.
IV.

[Vol. 60:6:1633

Animal Studies Evidence ........................................ 1655
Brain Science Evidence........................................... 1659
Child Development Evidence .................................. 1664
1.
Predictable Stages of Development ............. 1664
2.
Making Subtle and Complex Judgments
at an Early A ge ............................................ 1666
a.
DistinguishingMoral, Conventional,
and PrudentialRules ....................... 1667
b.
Judging the Relative Seriousness of
Wrongful Conduct............................. 1669
c.
JudgingBlameworthiness with
Factorsbeyond Offense Seriousness. 1672
3.
Cross-Cultural Developmental Studies ...... 1674
Sum mary of Evidence ............................................. 1676

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: GENERAL SOCIAL

LEARNING AND EFFICIENT NORMS ..................................... 1677

A.

B.

Spontaneous Social Learning................................. 1678
1.
Preferring Group Interests Over
Individual Interests ..................................... 1679
2.
Complexity of Determining Efficient
Norms as Beyond Individual Capacity ....... 1680
Accumulated Social Learning ................................ 1681
1.
Absence of Variation in Intuitions of
Justice Among Groups Despite Large
Differences in Situation and Culture .......... 1682
2.
Inconsistency with Developmental Data .... 1683
3.
Intuitional Knowledge as Having Distinct
Characteristics from Learned Knowledge .. 1684
4.
Difficulties in Teaching Inarticulable
Lessons ........................................................ 1686

C O N CLU SION .................................................................................. 1687

I. THE PUZZLE: SHARED INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE

The role of justice in assigning criminal liability and
punishment has been a matter of long-standing debate. A standard
argument against a desert distributive principle-that is, against
distributing punishment according to an offender's blameworthiness-

20071

INTUITIONS OFJUSTICE

1635

has been that such a concept of "desert" is simply too vague and the
subject of too much disagreement to operationalize. 1 There may be
some truth to these complaints when applied to a philosophical notion
2
of desert, which has been the traditional basis of the desert school.
But more recently, a utilitarian-based theory of desert has
urged reliance on an empirical notion of desert, drawn from the
community's shared intuitions of justice rather than from the
reasoned concepts of moral philosophy. 3 The same objections about
vagueness and lack of agreement are lodged against this empirical
notion of desert. People's intuitions of justice, it is claimed, are simply
too vague to be relied on and, in any case, there is too much
disagreement about what constitutes deserved punishment to
construct a workable criminal justice system. It is the common wisdom
that little agreement exists among people's intuitions of justice:
[E]ven assuming retribution in distribution is appropriate, there is a classic
epistemological problem. How do we know how much censure, or "deserved
punishment," a particular wrongdoer absolutely deserves? God may know, but as
countless sentencing exercises have shown, peoples' intuitions about individual cases
4
vary widely.
There is ... reason to doubt that anything like a consensus exists on the seriousness of
criminal conduct. While there may be some agreement on relative levels of harm, there
appears to be great variation in perceptions of the absolute magnitude of harm
represented by various criminal acts, and in either the relative or absolute level of
5
culpability represented by various criminal actors.

1.
Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological,
and Empirical 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with authors).
2.
Id.
3.
Id.; Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453
(1997).
4.
Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1233, 1263 (2005).
5.
John Monahan, The Case for Prediction in the Modified Desert Model of Criminal
Sentencing, 5 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 103, 105 (1982). Other authors have made similar
arguments:
[Desert theorists argue that] we can work out one single, linear ordering of crimes,
from least to most "serious." Yet that scarcely seems a credible assumption. Try, for
instance, to rank the following crimes in order of their "seriousness": attempted
residential burglary, trading stock on inside information, negligent vehicular
homicide, bribing a mine-safety inspector, possessing an ounce of cocaine, and burning
a cross on the lawn of black newcomers to a previously all-white neighborhood. To
view this motley assortment along a single dimension of "seriousness" would seem no
less difficult than to perceive the inner logic behind the apocryphal Chinese
encyclopedist of Jorge Luis Borges's imagination.
David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism,
Similarly, Ernest van den Haag argues:
[Desert theorists moreover appear] to believe
crimes can be determined in all cases. Not
determined only for some crimes, and it does

39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1638-39 (1992).
that the comparative seriousness of
so. Comparative seriousness can be
not fully determine the comparative
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In this respect, the common wisdom is simply wrong. Part of
the confusion here arises from the failure to distinguish two distinct
judgments: setting the endpoint of the punishment continuum and,
once that endpoint has been set, ordinally ranking all cases along that
continuum. The first of these judgments is not really a distributive
judgment, at least in the sense that it is not part of the adjudication
process. Rather, every society must decide what punishment it will
allow for its most egregious case, be it the death penalty or life
imprisonment or fifteen years. Once that endpoint is set, the challenge
for the adjudication system is to determine whom to punish and how
much punishment to impose. The process of distributing punishment
requires only an ordinal ranking of offenders according to their
blameworthiness. The result is a specific amount of punishment, but
that amount of punishment is not selected because there is some
intrinsic connection between that offense and that amount of
punishment. Rather, it is selected because, given the large number of
cases with distinguishable blameworthiness and the limited range of
punishment, that specific amount of punishment is required to set the
offender in his appropriate ordinal rank according to his relative
blameworthiness. If the punishment continuum endpoint is changed,
6
the appropriate punishment for each offender changes accordingly.
A wide variety of empirical studies indicate that people broadly
share intuitions that serious wrongdoing should be punished and also
share intuitions about the relative blameworthiness of different
transgressions. 7 In some studies, subjects were asked to put offenses
or offense scenarios into one of a set of predetermined categories; in
another kind of study, subjects were asked to rank-order offenses or
offense scenarios; in a third kind of study, subjects were asked to
assign numerical values to each of a number of offenses or offense
8
scenarios.

punishment deserved. If rape is a crime and murder is a crime, rape-murder must be
more serious than either. Does rape-murder deserve the sum of the punishments
meted out for rape and for murder? More? Less? Even when crimes are nearly
homogeneous, assigning seriousness is arbitrary: Is rape more serious than assault
with a deadly weapon? Is burglary more serious than fraud when fraud does more
harm? What about mishandling toxic waste? Ordinal determinations of seriousness
become altogether arbitrary when the seriousness of heterogeneous crimes must be
compared.
Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1254
(1987).
6.
Robinson, supranote 1 (manuscript at 7-8).
7.
For a general discussion of these matters, see Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban,
Concordance & Conflict in Intuitions of Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1854-55 (2007).

8.

Id. at 1837-40.
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The results in all of these studies are consistent. First, subjects
displayed a good deal of nuance in the judgments they made. 9 Small
changes in facts produced large and predictable changes in
punishment. Second, subjects indicated an interest in imposing
punishment for serious wrongdoing.' 0 Finally, subjects indicated
considerable agreement about the relative amount of punishment that
different offenders deserved.' 1 Indeed, the ordinal ranking of cases
generally is consistent across demographic categories, including
different cultural groups, as evidenced in cross-cultural studies that
replicated domestic studies. 12 Typical of the conclusions in these
studies, and according to Graeme Newman,"it is apparent that there
was considerable agreement as to the amount of punishment
appropriate to each act,"'13 and looking at relative rankings indicates
"general agreement in ranks across all countries." 14
The striking extent of the agreement on intuitions of justice is
illustrated in a recent study that asked subjects to rank-order twentyfour crime scenario descriptions according to the amount of
punishment deserved. 15 Most researchers would consider this a quite
demanding task, perhaps asking for more concentration and effort
than most subjects are willing or able to provide. Yet the study's
authors found that their subjects had little difficulty performing the
task. Moreover, the task was also quite complex, requiring subjects to
compare the deserved punishment for each scenario to the deserved
punishment for each of the other twenty-three scenarios. Nonetheless,
subjects displayed an astounding level of agreement in the ordinal
ranking of the scenarios.
A statistical measure of concordance is found in Kendall's
coefficient of concordance ("Kendall's W"), in which 1.0 indicates
perfect agreement and 0.0 indicates no agreement. In the study just

9.

Id. at 1846.

10.

Id. at 1842-53.

11.

Id. at 1854-65.

12.

Id.

13.

GRAEME NEWMAN, COMPARATIVE DEVIANCE: PERCEPTION AND LAW IN SIX CULTURES 140

(1976).
14. Id. at 141-43 (providing a table listing data by country); see also id. at 135-48
(discussing variability deriving from differences in views regarding how particular acts should be
controlled or punished). People from different cultures might share the intuition that an act is
wrong, and even a view on each act's relative seriousness, yet still differ in how punishment
should be imposed, whether by the state, family, or some other source. This discussion highlights
the importance of assessing intuitions regarding seriousness as distinct from preferred
punishments meted out by the state. While the former might be correlated strongly with the
latter in some contexts, it will be less so in others.
15. Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 7, at 1867-74.
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described, the Kendall's W was 0.95 (with p < .001).16 This is a striking
level of agreement. One might expect a similarly high Kendall's W if
subjects were asked to judge the relative brightness of different
groupings of spots, for example.1 7 In the context of more subjective or
complex comparisons, such as asking travel magazine readers to rank
the attractiveness of eight different destinations, a Kendall's W of 0.52
is typical.' 8 When asking economists to rank the top twenty economics
journals according to quality, one gets a Kendall's W of 0.095.19
How can it be that when asking people to perform a
comparative task as complex and subjective as assessing the relative
blameworthiness of twenty-four different offenders, their level of
concurrence matches that for much more simple and objective
comparative tasks? That is the puzzle that this Article explores.
One possible explanation is the effect of evolutionary processes,
which can generate cognitive and behavioral predispositions that help
individuals solve commonly encountered problems in ancestral
environments. Part II explains how these processes might underlie the
phenomenon of shared intuitions of justice. Part III examines evidence
from animal behavior studies, brain science, and child development
studies that are consistent with the evolutionary explanation. Part IV
considers an alternative explanation: that shared intuitions of justice
might arise through general social learning because particular
intuitions of justice provide efficient norms for group functioning.
However, the social learning explanation has a variety of difficulties.
To note just one, consider the wide diversity in the life experiences of
individuals, and in the social context and structure of groups. Given
this, one would expect a social learning process to produce far more
than the observed variations in intuitions of justice. On present
16. Id.
17. See Charles M.M. de Weert & Noud A.W.H. van Kruysbergen, Assimilation: Central and
PeripheralEffects, 26 PERCEPTION 1217, 1219-24 (1997) (obtaining a Kendall's W of 0.95 when
subjects compared brightness).
18. Baruch Fischhoff et al., Travel Risks in a Time of Terror: Judgments and Choices, 24
RISK ANALYSIS 1301 (2004).

19. The analysis of complex comparisons of journal rankings among economists reveals a
relatively low Kendall's W:
These results unveil significant diversity in the journal quality perceptions
among groups of economists despite the fact that our sample focused on [American
Economic Association] members. To test the robustness of this claim, using Kendall's
W we examined the correlation in journal quality perceptions between any two
randomly selected economists in our sample. We found Kendall's W for the top ten
journals in our rankings to be 0.396, which demonstrates a relatively low level of
agreement among economists. Once we extended this exercise to the top 20 journals in
our rankings, Kendall's W dropped to only 0.095.
Kostas Axarloglou & Vasilis Theoharakis, Diversity in Economics: An Analysis of Journal
Quality Perceptions, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 1402, 1421 (2003).
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evidence, we conclude, the evolutionary explanation of shared
intuitions of justice seems more plausible than a universal social
learning explanation.
II. AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION
Part I paints a striking picture of human intuitions of justice:
across demographics, even across cultures, humans share nuanced
intuitions (1) about what constitutes serious wrongdoing, (2) that
serious wrongdoing should be punished, and (3) about the relative
blameworthiness of offenders. How can matters of such nuance and
complexity show this degree of agreement despite dramatic differences
in individuals' social and cultural context and upbringing? How can it
be that persons of dramatically different religious, economic, and
educational backgrounds and of different races, ages, and genders
share the same intuitions of justice? We suggest that one explanation
for this homogeneity of human intuitions of justice derives from that
which all humans share by virtue of being human: their unique
20
evolutionary history and resulting human nature.
In this Part, we first briefly offer a primer for the role of genes
in the development of an individual's traits; we then describe how
evolutionary processes, most notably natural selection, operate to
preserve both anatomical and behavioral traits that helped to solve
challenges regularly encountered by ancestors over evolutionary time.
We then explain how the process of solving those challenges can lead
to a variety of common psychological preferences in humans, including
some general moral preferences. And we subsequently discuss how,
more specifically, those evolutionary processes can result in shared
intuitions of justice in the context of punishments for wrongdoing.
A. The Expression of Genes
It is relatively uncontroversial that evolutionary processes,
genes, and environments all influence human predispositions and
20. In this, we extend work that addresses the intersections of law and evolutionary
processes. See, e.g., THE SENSE OF JUSTICE: BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW (Roger D. Masters
& Margaret Gruter eds., 1992); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005); Owen D. Jones, Proprioception,NonLaw, and Biolegal History, 53 FLA. L. REV. 831 (2001); Michael T. McGuire, Moralistic
Aggression, Processing Mechanisms, and the Brain: The Biological Foundations of the Sense of
Justice, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE, supra at 31, 44 (arguing that there is likely "a speciescharacteristic biological basis for assessing events as just or unjust"); Society for Evolutionary
Analysis in Law (SEAL), Owen D. Jones, Useful Sources: Biology, Evolution, and Law,
http://www.sealsite.org (located under "Scholarly Resources" tab) (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
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resultant behaviors. But precisely how those influences interact, on
which predispositions and behaviors, and with what consequences and
implications, represent important questions under continuing
investigation. Even what is known is often misunderstood.
Consequently, we start with a brief primer on the general principles
by which evolutionary processes, genes, and environments can affect
21
behaviors, and how they cannot.
1. Genetic Influences versus Genetic Determinism
Genetic explanations do not imply that a trait is "hard wired"
or "inflexible." All human traits exist because of the interaction
between an individual's set of genes-a subset of all possible human
genes-and the unique combination of environmental conditions a
person encounters while developing. 22 The effect of any given gene
depends on many factors, such as the presence or absence of other
genes, the body's internal environment (e.g., cells), the individual's
external environment, and so forth. 23 Gene expression, therefore, is
extremely complex and is always influenced by the (broadly construed)
environment the gene encounters.
It is clear that changing genes or changing environments
changes traits, whether physical or psychological. And there is
consequently widespread consensus that environmental determinism
and genetic determinism are both incorrect. 24 Human minds are
neither "blank slate[s]" to be written on by experience, 25 nor
completely the product of genetics. They are, rather, the products of
complex interactions between genes and their developmental
environments, all under the relentless influence of evolutionary
21. Key works in evolutionary biology generally include DOUGLAS J. FUTUYMA,
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY (3d ed. 1998) and MARK RIDLEY, EVOLUTION (3d ed. 2004). Useful works
with behavioral emphases include JOHN ALCOCK, ANIMAL BEHAVIOR: AN EVOLUTIONARY
APPROACH (8th ed. 2005); RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (30th anniversary ed. 2006);
and TIMOTHY H. GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM F. ZIMMERMAN, BIOLOGY, EVOLUTION, AND HUMAN
NATURE (2001). Primers written explicitly for legal thinkers also appear in Jones & Goldsmith,
supra note 20, at 426-31 and Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: An Introduction and
Application to Child Abuse, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1117, 1127-57 (1997).
22. See, e.g., MARY JANE WEST-EBERHARD, DEVELOPMENTAL PLASTICITY AND EVOLUTION
(2003).
23. Id.
24. JEFFREY L. ELMAN ET AL., RETHINKING INNATENESS: A CONNECTIONIST PERSPECTIVE ON
DEVELOPMENT (1996); STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN
NATURE 76, 113 (2002); MATT RIDLEY, NATURE VIA NURTURE: GENES, EXPERIENCE, AND WHAT

MAKES US HUMAN (2003); Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 485-88.
25. This still-common view was given powerful voice by John Locke. See, e.g.,
JOHN LOCKE,
AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 121 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., Encyclopaedia
Britannica 1952) (1690).
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pressures that have favored some patterns of interactions over
26
others.
2. The Genetic Code as a Recipe for Development
Although a "blueprint" provides a tempting metaphor for the
genetic code, a better metaphor is a "recipe." 27 Without the presence of
the appropriate environment (a cook and kitchen), genes (recipes)
have no important causal consequences. In the realm of biological
development, the dynamic interplay between genes and environment
is exceedingly complex. 28 Biochemical interactions at the cellular level
and the building of connections in the brain are vastly intricate and
still little understood. However, this complexity does not imply that no
prediction can be made about an individual's development, nor does it
imply that development is so complex as to be essentially random.
Rather, even psychological traits that are "learned," such as language,
are brought about by a predictable interaction between an individual's
29
genes and the environment in which the individual develops.
The genes that humans share cause each person's structures to
be built in a predictable and systematic way. Consider the human
visual system. Every human visual system receives different stimuli
because every baby is born into a unique perceptual world with
different objects (e.g., people and animals). However, the mature
visual system for all normally developed adults is essentially the
same. When a trait such as this emerges across a wide range of
environments, it is said to be "reliably developing." Human genes
ensure that even these complex elements of the body are
"reincarnated" each generation. 30 Because the developmental process
for human psychological traits is complex, it is easier to see such trait
"reincarnation" in physical traits. Consider Gray's Anatomy. 3 1 A book
26. PINKER, supra note 24.
27. See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE EVIDENCE OF EVOLUTION
REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT A DESIGN 52 (W.W. Norton & Co. reissue ed. 1996) ('The genes,

as we shall see, are more like a recipe than like a blueprint ...").
28. For an overview of recent research in the field of evolutionary development, see SEAN B.
CARROLL, ENDLESS FORMS MOST BEAUTIFUL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVO DEVO AND THE MAKING
OF THE ANIMAL KINGDOM (2005).

29.

John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE

ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF CULTURE

19, 83-84

(Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992). For this reason, attempting to dichotomize important
human traits as only culturally or genetically influenced is misguided.
30. John Tooby et al., The Second Law of Thermodynamics is the First Law of Psychology,
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 858, 863-64 (2003).
31.

HENRY GRAY, GRAY'S ANATOMY: THE ANATOMICAL BASIS OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY

(Susan Standring ed., Elsevier Churchill Livingstone 39th ed. 2005) (1858).
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about "the human body" is possible only because all humans develop
in the same reliable, systematic fashion, despite the obvious
complexities of that process. And, important to our purposes here,
even psychological traits, such as the capacity to learn a language,
follow a similar pattern.
Of course, development is not necessarily uniform across all
individuals. In the context of language learning, the developing child
has a special capacity to acquire the ability to understand and produce
language that the child hears spoken. 32 But all normal humans have
this special language-acquisition mechanism. Other species do not. A
cat exposed to the same linguistic environment learns to understand
few words, if any. We will argue below that, just as they do with
language, people have a specific ability to acquire intuitions of justice.
The intuitions that result from this acquisition mechanism are not
"innate" in a naive sense of the term, such as "present at birth."
Instead, we argue that there exists a predisposition by which people
acquire these intuitions over the course of development both as a child
and as an adult.
Which language a child acquires depends on the linguistic
environment, but the genes that allow language acquisition play a role
as important as the presence of linguistic sounds.3 3 All normally
developing humans in Topeka acquire the syntax and vocabulary of
English, while those in Tokyo learn Japanese. In this instance, the
environmental variation leads to differences in the developed adult. In
short, the effect of experience varies from one trait to another, with
some traits being relatively constant across environments (vision) and
others being different across environments (language).
The reason for the differential effect of environment can be
traced back to the logic of evolved adaptations (which we describe in
the next section). The process of evolution resulted in the selection of a
developmental process, which results in the development of the visual
system in such a way that it does not depend on the details of the
specific stimuli that are in one's visual world because, by virtue of the
universal principles of optics, the same solution to vision applies in
every setting. This is not the case for language, however, as the most
useful language to learn depends on the language others around you

32. See NOAM CHOMSKY, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE: ITS NATURE, ORIGIN, AND USE 3
(1986).
33. See Gary F. Marcus & Simon E. Fisher, FOXP2 in Focus: What Can Genes Tell Us about
Speech and Language?, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 257 (2003).
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are speaking. For this reason, evolutionary processes left specific
34
elements of language acquisition to vary across groups.
B. Evolution as a Process of Solving Survival Problems
Most of the significant genes that distinguish us as "human"
are ones that were selected over the course of the last 250,000
generations because their effects led to reproductive success. 35 More
specifically, current human genes are in large measure the ones that
caused individuals to survive and reproduce better, on average, than
did alternative genes. Evolution by natural selection, therefore, is the
origin of all complex, functional human traits, whether physical or
psychological. 36 The success of one gene over another is generally the
result of its contribution to solving problems that humans faced, such
as finding nutritious food, choosing good mates, raising a family,
avoiding predation, and so forth. Genes that contributed to success in
confronting these problems were selected (meaning they tended to
appear in increasingly large percentages in successive generations).
Thus, the traits these genes produced can be understood as having
functions, or means by which these problems were solved.
Traits are typically specific in function. That is, to guide the
organism toward positive reproductive outcomes, specific traits are
needed to solve different problems. This is evident in physical organ
systems, for example, as the heart is good at pumping blood but bad at
filtering it for toxins, while the reverse is true for the liver. And the
human visual system is good at using light to learn about what is out
in the world, but it is not well equipped to acquire language.
Specificity of function is the hallmark of natural selection because

34.

STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT: HOW THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 240-43

(1994).
35.

This estimate is commonly used. See, e.g., Colm O'hUigin et al., The Implications of

Intergenic Polymorphism for Major Histocompatibility Complex Evolution, 156 GENETICS 867,

873 (2000). It corresponds to a period of roughly five million years, the estimated time since
human and chimpanzee ancestors diverged. Feng-Chi Chen & Wen-Hsiung Li, Genomic
Divergences Between Humans and Other Hominoids and the Effective Population Size of the
Common Ancestor of Humans and Chimpanzees, 68 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 444, 444 (2001).

36. Obviously, there is more to this issue than can be covered here. Changes in gene
frequencies in a population can occur as the result of multiple processes, including genetic drift
and natural selection. See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 21. However, natural selection is commonly
considered the one process that can generate both increases in complexity and a close fit between
the features of an organism and its environment. "Natural selection" refers to the result of three
conditions: a) variation, b) heritability, and c) differential reproduction of individuals as a
function of their heritable variations. The process was famously identified and described in
CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (Penguin Classics

ed. 1985) (1859).
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mechanisms such as the heart and the visual system tend to work best
when they help to solve a narrow task, in the same way that tools
work best when they are designed for one particular job. The same
holds for many psychological traits. In sum, much of human
psychology consists of evolved, reliably developing traits that have
functions associated with the adaptive problems faced by our
ancestors. Modern human minds contain psychological adaptations
37
that successfully solved our ancestors' adaptive problems.
C. The Evolution of General Moral and Proto-LegalSentiments
No one yet knows the full suite of psychological adaptations
that human minds share. And given the complexity of the interactions
between genes and culture, it is often unclear what can be said with
confidence about how the human brain works. Yet in order to bridge
from the general notion of evolved psychological adaptations to our
specific suggestion that shared intuitions of justice reflect evolved
adaptations, we need to lay a brief foundation for the idea that
preferences-and indeed loosely "moral" sentiments-can evolve.
Fortunately, there is ample reason, at both theoretical and empirical
levels, to believe that human minds share a wide variety of
preferences that range from the hedonic to the moral.
Like most evolved human capacities, the psychological
adaptations that steer humans through the complex social world have
functions that led to reproductive success in the past. The function
and concurrent reproductive advantages conferred by some human
social adaptations are relatively obvious. Few could doubt that our
species-typical preferences to sleep at night (on average) rather than
during the day, to provision our own children over the children of
other people, or to seek pleasure in sexual activity with others of our
own rather than another species, reflect complex cognitive processes
that in turn reflect evolutionary adaptations as well as the cultural
overlays that may adjust the contexts and patterns in which we do so.
The evolutionary logic is clear. And other species behave similarly,
given the physical and behavioral niches that they have evolved to
38
exploit.
The conclusion from the foregoing is that complex functional
human psychological and behavioral traits are the results of
adaptation through natural selection. These include not only traits

37.

John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Past Explains The Present: Emotional Adaptations

and the Structure of Ancestral Environments, 11 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 375 (1990).

38.

See generally GOLDSMITH & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 21; RIDLEY, supra note 21.
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relevant to mating and parenting and kinship, but also traits relating
to the particular challenges of group living, which include aggression,
competition, cooperation, deception, and moral sentiments enabling
the evaluation of good and bad behaviors. 39 Previous work has
suggested that these preferences resulted in proto-legal systems of
40
social primate interaction.
Consider the sentiments leading to judgments and, later, laws
surrounding incest. Because of the detrimental effects of inbreeding,
evolution appears to have selected for genes that cause organisms to
develop behavioral systems that lead them away from mating with
close genetic relatives. 41 In humans, this manifests itself as disgust
and, perhaps concomitantly, a shared sense that committing incest is
wrong.
The intuition has been shown through experimentation not to
derive from logical rationales. Experimental subjects insist on the
wrongfulness of incest, even if they are unable to articulate principled
reasons for why incestuous relationships are wrong. 42 Incest-avoiding
mechanisms serve their evolutionary function without awareness of
this function on the part of the individual organism. 43 Such an
39. See generally FRANS B.M. DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG
IN HUMANS AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY (David
M. Buss ed., 2005); INVESTIGATING THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN MORALITY (James
P. Hurd ed., 1996); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: THE NEW SCIENCE OF EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY (1994); Dennis Krebs, The Evolution of Morality, in THE HANDBOOK OF

EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra,at 747, 768 ("The mechanisms that give rise to morality are
biological adaptations ....).
40.

See, e.g., OSTRACISM: A SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL PHENOMENON (Margaret Gruter &

Roger D. Masters eds., 1986).
41.

See 2 EDVARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 218-39 (5th ed. 1971)

(1891) (arguing that natural selection eliminated injurious inbreeding tendencies); Irene Bevc &
Irwin Silverman, Early Proximity and Intimacy Between Siblings and Incestuous Behavior: A
Test of the Westermarck Theory, 14 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1993).
42. See, e.g., Debra Lieberman et al., Does Morality Have a Biological Basis?: An Empirical
Test of the Factors Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, 270 PROC.: BIOLOGICAL SCI.
819 (2003); see also Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social
Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001); Jonathan Haidt &
Matthew Hersh, Sexual Morality: The Cultures and Emotions of Liberals and Conservatives, 31
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 191 (2001). This insistence applies even to cases in which, for example,
the consummated sex act is between adult siblings, fully consensual, one time, and incapable of
leading to pregnancy. Id. at 197, 213-14.
43. Neither a conscious motive to avoid deleterious inbreeding nor an ability to detect the
degree of genetic relatedness is necessary. Even the inclination in many animals to leave their
natal group upon reaching sexual maturity can serve this function. See, e.g., T.H. Clutton-Brock,
Female Transfer and Inbreeding Avoidance in Social Mammals, 337 NATURE 70, 70 (1989). In
humans, as in many species, for example, natural selection appears to have favored a
predisposition against mating with those who were co-resident opposite-sex siblings during
childhood-which has historically been a reliable proxy for close genetic relatedness. Lieberman
et al., supra note 42, at 825.
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intuition is highly adaptive: people who had this intuition, in contrast
to those not having it, enjoyed greater long-term reproductive success,
leaving more offspring who likewise successfully reproduced. 44 This
was accomplished by directing the individual away from inbreeding
and its concurrent genetic costs. Incest provides a clear example of
how natural selection can favor the evolution of intuitions about
wrongdoing whose particular functions are relevant to reproductive
success.
D. The Evolution of Intuitions of Justice
Given the influence of genes, environments, and evolutionary
processes on human problem-solving through evolved behavioral
predispositions-including moral ones-it is a small but significant
logical step to suggest that shared intuitions of justice, specific to
punishments for transgressions of varying seriousness, also reflect our
common evolutionary history. We argue below that human sociality
has laid the foundation for an evolved predisposition to acquire shared
intuitions of justice and that such intuitions benefit the individuals
bearing them. Further, we argue there is reason to believe that
evolution has in particular contributed to intuitions that physical
harm, the taking of property, and cheating in exchanges are matters
45
for particular attention and condemnation.
1. Human Sociality and the Predisposition to Acquire Shared
Intuitions of Justice
The predisposition to acquire human intuitions of justice likely
arose from the deeply and innately social nature of the human species.
Humans have been described as "ultrasocial" by anthropologists
because of the many ways in which humans interact with one another,
particularly in the context of cooperation between individuals and

44. 2 WESTERMARCK, supra note 41, at 220, 236-39,
45. Recently, Marc Hauser suggested how evolution could have led to the human capacity
for morality. Though similar in locating the origins of justice in the theory of evolution by natural
selection, and in using language as an analogy to motivate the analysis, our treatment differs in
that it focuses on the advantages conferred to individuals in having particular intuitions
regarding punishment for wrongful acts. Hauser links the intuition that wrongdoing be punished
to intuitions about fairness. MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: How NATURE DESIGNED OUR
UNIVERSAL SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG 108-09 (2006) ("We can safely assume that these

intuitions evolved prior to or during our life as hunter-gatherers ....
In such small-scale
societies, fairness was most likely an effective proxy for judging punishable acts.").
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within groups. 46 Group cooperation is relatively uncommon in the
biological world-though there are exceptions, such as certain groupliving insects-and captures the attention of biologists because
evolution, broadly, tends to favor genes that lead to selfish behavior.
Humans, however, behave altruistically in many contexts: family
relations, friendships, and within-group cooperation. How does such
extensive cooperation come to pass? The evolution of cooperation in
humans and other species is the subject of a large theoretical and
empirical literature in evolutionary biology, 4 7 and the general outline
is relevant to our argument.
Both theoretical and empirical scholarship demonstrates that
cooperation can evolve through several independent but overlapping
processes. 48 The one most relevant for our immediate purpose
concerns the mutually beneficial effects of reciprocity: if you share
with me today in exchange for my sharing with you yesterday, we are
both better off than if neither of us shares. In social animals,
reciprocity can involve such things as alerting other group members
when food has been discovered, sharing food over time, and supporting
a comrade in action against others.
But underlying this rosy picture is a darker shadow. While it is
evident that reciprocators can outperform loners, a cheater (or
defector) could theoretically outperform both if he were able to take
benefits regularly without repaying them. Consequently, an
46.

Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Human Ultrasociality, in

INDOCTRINABILITY, IDEOLOGY, AND WARFARE: EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVES 71, 71-72 (Irenaus

Eibl-Eibesfeldt & Frank Kemp Salter eds., 1998).
47. That literature suggests that several causal processes are simultaneously at work. One,
known as mutualism, reflects the fact that two working together can sometimes gain more than
the sum of their actions, if they had acted alone. A second, known as kin selection, reflects the
extent to which cooperatively furthering the reproductive success of kin increases the prevalence
of any heritable predisposition to do so, since many kin will also carry the genes that contribute
to that predisposition. A third, known as reciprocal altruism, reflects the fact that heritable
predispositions to cooperate over time can yield mutual benefits, even between unrelated
cooperators. On the extent to which these processes may be supplemented by other processes, see
Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 169
(2000).
There is debate surrounding why humans evolved to be the extremely social animals that
they are. For purposes of the current discussion, we remain agnostic on this debate and simply
assume that humans are social creatures, have been for many generations, and have many traits
that are adapted for social life. See, e.g., Leda Cosmides, The Logic of Social Exchange: Has
NaturalSelection Shaped How Humans Reason?, 31 COG. 187, 187-97 (1989); Tooby & Cosmides,
supra note 29, at 19, 20; Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV.
BIOLOGY 35, 35-39 (1971). On the possible origins of social exchange in humans, and the inverse
relationship between social hierarchy and social exchange, see CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY
IN THE FOREST: THE EVOLUTION OF EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR 197, 197-99, 213 (1999).
48. See generally LEE ALAN DUGATKIN, COOPERATION AMONG ANIMALS: AN EVOLUTIONARY
PERSPECTIVE (1997).

1648

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:6:1633

evolutionary arms race ensues in social animals between various
predispositions toward cooperation and exploitation. In the end, the
most successful cooperators are not those who always cooperate, but
those who cooperate selectively with other cooperators, thus
discriminating (passively or aggressively) against those who are not
reliable partners in cooperative endeavors. 49 Put another way,
effective cooperation requires rewarding good behavior and punishing
(or at least failing to reward) bad behavior.
For reciprocal altruism to work, though, one must be able to
evaluate the costs and benefits of various kinds of things (such as
different objects, acts, and information) and evaluate others' valuation
of those objects. One also must be able to discern unfairness, such as
an inequitable distribution of resources or a violation of reciprocity.
Furthermore, one must be able to recognize individuals and remember
recent interactions with them, so as to discriminate in the future in
favor of some and against others. 50 These are precisely the features
that we tend to observe in the most highly social animals. 51
Those features are also, we argue, precisely those that likely
underlie the functional advantage of the specific learning capacity in
humans for acquiring shared intuitions of justice. Humans have a
universal and uniquely nuanced propensity for engaging in social
exchange. 52 Indeed, gains from social exchange form the basis of the
modern economy and infiltrate nearly every aspect of our lives, 53 both
in formal markets and in personal relationships. The psychology that
underpins
exchange requires deep intuitions and complex
computational capacities to operate.
In particular, one critical capacity for successful social
exchange is the intuition that one should punish individuals who
injure others or cheat in an exchange. If one is engaged in
transactions with the same person over time, then allowing another to
injure or to cheat with no punishment is an invitation to exploit
without end. Therefore, to be most successful in social exchange, one
must have the capacity not only to detect but also to punish such
persons.

49.

See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).

50. For a detailed list of these requirements, see Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 29, at 110.
51. See generally DE WAAL, supra note 39 (discussing reciprocal altruism and its basis in
the remembrance of favors given and received).
52. Social exchange is the simultaneous or sequential delivery of benefits between two
individuals for mutual profit.
53.

See generally ROBERT WRIGHT, NONZERO:

THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY (2000).

Exchange allows non-zero-sum interactions, in which each participant is better off exchanging
than alone. Id. at 26.
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This implies that there might have been selection in humans
for the cognitive mechanisms designed to detect inequities and,
similarly, for the cognitive mechanisms that yield intuitions that
motivate the punishment of people who violate the most ancient and
fundamentally necessary principles of social exchange.5 4 In other
words, the evolutionary history of social exchange has likely led to a
reliably developing psychological system that is able to compute when
55
someone has injured or cheated and to motivate punishment.
2. Intuitions of Justice as Generating Benefits for Individuals
The argument sketched so far may explain why humans have
intuitions that lead them to believe that people who have harmed or
cheated them ought to be punished. However, this does not explain
why people have intuitions that punishment should be imposed on
wrongdoers in transactions in which they have no part. This
question-why people care about third-party transactions-opens the
door to an important mystery. Most non-human organisms attend very
little to transactions that occur between unrelated others (though
there are some important exceptions 56 ). Why do humans care so much
about these interactions? Our analysis follows along these lines:
Once individuals possess intuitions about being wronged,
detecting when others have been wronged is possible using the same
set of intuitions. This does not, by itself, explain why individuals
should care that someone else has been wronged; it merely explains
the origin of the ability to detect wrongful acts toward others.
What may explain the interest in wrongdoing to others is that
individuals need to make decisions about the people with whom they
interact, engage in social exchange, form groups and coalitions, and,
more generally, socialize. One observing a third party committing a
wrong against another person has important information about the
perpetrator of the wrong; this information may make the observer less
likely to choose that person for social interactions.
Another puzzle exists: why do people have the intuition that
wrongs to others should be punished? The evolutionary advantage of
this intuition is debatable,5 7 but we advance some ideas that help
54.

For recent discussion, see Herbert Gintis, Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality, 206

J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 169 (2000).

55. For suggestive nonhuman evidence, see infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
57. For early thinking on this subject, see Trivers, supra note 47, passim, which discusses
how selection can operate against those who fail to reciprocate; see also MATT RIDLEY, THE
ORIGINS OF VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996), which
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explain the preference. The logic begins with the uncontroversial
premise that humans evolved in relatively small groups consisting of
people with whom they had a large number of transactions over a
sustained period. 58 Consider two kinds of groups: first, one in which
individuals whose acts of unprovoked violence, theft, or cheating in
exchanges is left unpunished and, second, one in which these acts are
punished. In the second group, the individuals in the group benefit
because they are less likely to be subject to violence, theft, or cheating.
Thus, each person, to gain that benefit, has an incentive to inflict
punishment on those who commit such offenses. Of course,
punishment is potentially costly, so the long-term benefits of
punishing must outweigh the long-term costs if it is to be selected. 59
And very recent experimental evidence in humans suggests that
under such circumstances, given a choice, even prior transgressors
choose to be in a group that punishes over one that is punishment60
free.
However, personally punishing wrongdoers is not the only way
to increase the chances of being in a group in which undesirable acts
are punished. One need not inflict punishment oneself. One can
decrease the cost of inflicting punishment on wrongdoers by
supporting or defending those who inflict the punishment. A thirdparty punisher has a smaller risk of retaliation if group members
endorse the punishment meted out by the third party. Accordingly, an
individual benefits by having intuitions that support the
punishment-by some individual-of those who transgress. 61 In the
traces, among other things, the extent to which moralistic aggression can police fairness in social
exchanges, and thereby increase the prevalence of reciprocity by increasing the cost of cheating.
58. See generally BOEHM, supra note 47, passim.
59. See Richerson & Boyd, supra note 46, passim.
60. Ozgur Gurerk, Bernd Irlenbusch & Bettina Rockenbach, The Competitive Advantage of
SanctioningInstitutions, 312 SCIENCE 108, 110 (2006).
61. Alexander made similar arguments regarding reputation and the effects on the group of
having cooperative individuals. RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 94,

153 (1987). Trivers made a related argument. Robert Trivers, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 388 (1985) ("[A]
sense of fairness has evolved in human beings as the standard against which to measure the
behavior of other people, so as to guard against cheating in reciprocal relationships."); see also
Krebs, supra note 39, at 766-67 (noting that the high individual cost of punishment has
prompted members of society to create institutions to catch and punish cheaters); Dennis L.
Krebs, The Evolution of Moral Behaviors, in HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY: IDEAS,
ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS 337, 342 (Charles Crawford & Dennis L. Krebs eds., 1998) (arguing

that deference gives rise to moral behavior that involves adherence to and respect for the rules
and laws of authority); Robert Kurzban & Steven Neuberg, Managing Ingroup and Outgroup
Relationships, in THE HANDBOOK OF EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 659 (noting

that punishment in social exchange is sensible if it prevents future cheating).
We have considered the benefits flowing to individuals, as is standard in biology. Some,
proposing "multi-level selection," argue that considering benefits to the group yields an equal or
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small groups in which humans have evolved, the marginal benefit of
having each individual support punishment for wrongdoings might
have reduced the number of transgressions in the group and, thus,
protected an individual's health, property, and ability to make
62
contracts.
If it is true that (1) individuals prefer that wrongdoers be
punished and (2) individuals may not want to bear the costs of
inflicting punishment, it is not surprising that means have been
developed to satisfy these two preferences, though the means may
differ across the centuries and cultures. For example, in some
cultures, 63 one person has special responsibilities and duties in the
context of such punishment. In the West, punishment is administered
by a system of criminal justice, which includes legislatures, police,
judges, and so on.
In short, shared intuitions of justice contribute to the ability of
an individual or group to punish, which in turn provides an
evolutionary advantage to all. In other words, there is an evolutionary
advantage to understanding victimhood and to the concurrent

superior analysis. See, e.g., ELLIOT SOBER & DAVID SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE
EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR 331 (1998). In that view, groups that

effectively cooperated because of widely shared and specific intuitions of justice that benefited
the group could have outperformed groups without those intuitions, leading over time to more
groups composed of more people who share those intuitions. Game theoretic analysis suggests
that group-benefiting norms, and punishment through inflicting costs on those who do not follow
such norms, can be a powerful evolutionary force in the adoption, spread, and maintenance of
these norms. See, e.g., Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd & Ernst Fehr, Explaining
Altruistic Behavior in Humans, 24 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEAV. 153, 154 (2003); see also Peter J.
Richerson & Robert Boyd, The Evolution Of Subjective Commitment to Groups: A Tribal Instincts
Hypothesis, in EVOLUTION AND THE CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT 186-220 (Randolph M. Nesse

ed., 2001).
62. This last element, contracts, is worth special consideration. Because of humans' abilities
to represent abstract costs and benefits, the number of social exchanges that are possible is
much, much larger than in other organisms, who can exchange only narrowly delimited
commodities. If an organism cannot translate how beneficial or costly an object or act is
compared to another object or act, she cannot make good decisions about what counts as a good
exchange. As the range of possible exchanges increases, the advantage of the ability to enforce
contracts increases. See Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social
Exchange, in

THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE GENERATION OF

CULTURE 163, 177 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992) (discussing the computational
requirements of social exchange).
63. The punishment of wrongdoers can be implemented in multiple ways. One way is for
the individual who has been harmed to punish. Another way is for individuals not directly
involved to inflict punishment. Among the Huron, for example, the obligation to slay a murderer
reportedly fell upon the kin of the murderer. BRUCE G. TRIGGER, THE CHILDREN OF AATAENTSIC:
A HISTORY OF THE HURON PEOPLE TO 1660, 59-60 (1976). Moreover, another way is for

institutions to inflict punishment on those who have committed wrongs. This comes the closest to
the way in which modern states impose punishment: through an official criminal justice system
that formally represents all citizens of the state.
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condoning of the punishment of one who has engaged in wrongful
conduct. 64 This is important because the imposition of punishmentthe imposition of costs against the wrongdoer-is itself something that
normally would be seen as a wrongful act. To produce conditions that
avoid a never-ending spiral of wrongful acts, intuitions of justice must
specify that wrongful acts can be punished without eliciting the
further intuition that the punishers should themselves be punished.
To distinguish deserved punishment, which is permitted, from
undeserved punishment, which is not, the group obviously must share
some sense of what constitutes wrongful conduct and the amount of
65
punishment appropriate in any one case relative to other cases. If
everyone in a group agrees on this-what constitutes a wrongful act
and its relative wrongfulness as compared to other acts, hence the
relative amount of punishment to be permitted-stability and
cooperation, and the consequent benefits to members of the group, can
66
be achieved.
Contributing to the institutional arrangement for punishment
may not be the only reason that intuitions of justice evolved. Because
social exchange is mutually beneficial, participation in exchange is
desirable. When there are many social interactants in a group, there is
competition to be selected as a partner in exchange. We should
therefore expect that natural selection would favor predispositions
that signal that one is a good candidate for participation in such
exchanges. If one shares others' moral intuitions-that cheating in an
exchange is condemnable, for example-then one can expect selection
to favor those who signal having such an intuition. 67 Dennis Krebs and
Kathy Denton recently made this argument: "[p]ersuading others that
you are a fair, honest, generous, responsible and moral person who

64. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 40 (1997) (quoting John Stuart Mill's belief
that our sense of justice involves a "desire to punish wrongdoers, even when we are not the
victims").
65. The problem alluded to above, supra note 62, is essentially identical for punishment
because the means of punishment is often not in the same coin as the offense. If intuitions of
justice imply that harm should be inflicted on a perpetrator, then computing what constitutes a
harm of appropriate magnitude is crucial. This is a richly debated topic in many modern areas of
law (e.g., drug offenses). However, we believe that there are strong intuitions about the relative
severity of offenses and suggest that the complexity of the psychological systems necessary to
make such comparisons should not be underestimated. The cycle of harm, retaliation, and
retaliation for retaliation can escalate if the original punishment is judged too great, given the
magnitude of the offense.
66. See Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Solving the Puzzle of Human Cooperation, in
EVOLUTION AND CULTURE 105, 114-19 (Stephen C. Levinson & Pierre Jaisson eds., 2006).
67. See generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF
THE EMOTIONS (1988).
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will make an attractive exchange partner may induce them to bestow
68
benefits on you."
The emergence of intuitions of justice has a self-sustaining
character. Once the intuitions exist in a group, actions that violate
others' intuitions invite censure and punishment. Once the intuitions
of justice exist, it is disadvantageous to reject publicly the principles of
69
that system or to behave in ways that conflict with others' intuitions.
Thus, persons who do not reliably behave consistently with those
intuitions or do not signal their agreement in such shared intuitions
will be disadvantaged as against those who do.
To illustrate that "core" intuitions of justice should reliably
develop in all humans, consider the fate of a mutation that causes
individuals not to develop such intuitions. These individuals would be
punished by those they injured, stole from, or cheated, and they would
not be desired as social exchange partners or as members of groups.
For a social creature, such a fate would have been a reproductive
disaster. 70 The individual costs associated with having diverging
intuitions from those shared by others are a powerful force for
homogenizing the intuitions of justice. 71 Thus, once intuitions of
justice are in place, there would be strong pressure favoring any
variant in humans that acquires those intuitions, thus stabilizing
72
them and making them essentially universal in the species.
One might wonder why some details of human intuitions of
justice are widely shared, while others are not. 73 Intuitions of justice
that were advantageous no matter what the context should be
68. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More PragmaticApproach to Morality: A
CriticalEvaluationof Kohlberg's Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629, 642 (2005).
69. Indeed, formal game theoretical analyses have shown that punishment can lead
individuals to behave in accordance with an arbitrarily wide array of norms. Robert Boyd &
Peter J. Richerson, Punishment Allows the Evolution of Cooperation (or Anything Else) in Sizable
Groups, 13 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1992).
70. Robert Kurzban & Mark R. Leary, Evolutionary Origins of Stigmatization: The
Functionsof Social Exclusion, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 187, 192 (2001); see also Roy F. Baumeister &
Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for InterpersonalAttachments as a Fundamental
Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 521 (1995).
71. See, e.g., Joe Henrich & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist Transmissionand the
Emergence of Between-Group Differences, 19 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 215, 236 (1998).
72. Our argument does not turn on universality without exception. Most features of most
species appear in ranges reflecting variation in the genes and environments that give rise to
unique organisms. The breadth and distributions of features within those ranges is sensitive to
(among other things) the strength of selection pressures. Our argument is that there is good
reason to hypothesize that selection pressures in this context would yield very similar intuitions
of justice that are widespread across the human species.
73. See Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 7, at 1892-93, for a comparison of Parts I-III with
Part IV, noting that some intuitions of justice seem to be universal, while others outside the
"core" wrongdoings spark much disagreement.
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relatively consistent across individuals and should develop reliably
regardless of one's local environment. 74 These "core" intuitions
probably include the notions that unjustified physical aggression, the
taking of another's property, and cheating in exchanges are all wrong
and should be punished. 75 In contrast, it is unlikely that conduct that
less directly prevented beneficial social interaction-or that was more
dependent on social, economic, or other contexts-will be included in
the "core" intuitions that reliably develop today in all environments.
This is reflected in the cross-cultural, and even within-group,
divergence on such issues as drug use or prostitution, in which the
core intuitions regarding harm, theft, and deception are not violated.
III. EMPIRICAL SUPPORT FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY EXPLANATION
In Part II, we provided an evolutionary explanation for the
little-acknowledged but stunningly consistent and widely shared
intuitions of justice. On present evidence, one cannot know whether
our specific evolutionary explanation is correct. Unlike bones,
behavior does not fossilize, and one can only test the accuracy of
evolutionary accounts of behavior by triangulating from available
sources of information. This requires combining theories, offered in
Part II, with observations and experiments, which we take up in this
Part.
There is a good deal of empirical work that needs to be done,
in
the meantime, we can look to three existing areas that shed
but
some light on our hypothesis. First, we consider animal studies that
suggest evolved, rudimentary notions of fairness and blaming. Second,
we consider brain science studies that reveal identifiable physiological
processes at work when humans make moral judgments. Finally, we
examine the field of developmental psychology, which demonstrates a
common path in the development of moral reasoning in the human
child across demographics and cultures. We conclude that all three

74. See JEROME KAGAN, THE NATURE OF THE CHILD 123, 189 (1984) (discussing the
existence of universal moral standards); see also Richard A. Shweder & Jonathan Haidt, The
Future of Moral Psychology: Truth, Intuition and the Pluralist Way, 4 PSYCHOL. SCI. 360, 363
(1993) (discussing cognitive intuitionism's assumptions regarding the objectivity of moral
qualities).
75. See Jones, supra note 20, at 847-67, 860 fig.9 (arguing that these three notions,
alongside several others, have evolutionary roots). As a consequence, and to the extent that
evolutionary processes influence the content of predispositions, emotions, intuitions of justice,
and morality, the major features of legal systems will tend to reflect that influence. See id.; Jones
& Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 466-475, 474 tbl.1. For recent elaboration, see Robin Bradley Kar,
The Deep Structureof Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006).
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areas provide evidence generally consistent with our evolutionary
hypothesis. In contrast, we know of no data in direct conflict with it.

A. Animal Studies Evidence
If the evolutionary explanation for shared intuitions of justice
is correct, one might expect to find in other animals-especially our
close primate relatives-rudimentary forms of humans' core intuitions
about what constitutes wrongdoing and how it should be punished. In
fact, a number of socially cooperative species appear in some
circumstances to exhibit characteristics of "punishing" aggressors and
cheaters. And a number of researchers now suggest that such
behaviors may reflect a rudimentary moral sense or intuition of
justice. 76 Victims, the victims' relatives, and others sometimes avoid or
act aggressively towards individuals that deviate from various group
or dyadic norms and expectations.
These phenomena are not limited to primates, or even to
mammals Here are a few of many examples. In one social species of
wren, "helpers" assist by providing food when the young are being
raised. Helpers experimentally removed from the group during that
period are usually attacked and harassed upon their return, while
helpers absent at other times of the year are never attacked. 77 Within
the highly social naked mole rat communities, queens appear to focus
attacks on lazy workers. 78 Wolves apparently refuse to play with those
who violate the social rule against injurious play-fighting, and those
79
wolves leave the groups and die at higher-than-average rates.
Researchers studying animal punishment patterns have found
that behavior akin to theft is one particular target for retribution.8 0
For example, elephant seal pups caught trying to nurse from a female
who is not their mother are not just shooed away. Often, they are
bitten severely and sometimes killed.8 1 Young male deer attempting to

76. For an alternative view, see Jeffrey R. Stevens & Marc D. Hauser, Why Be Nice?
Psychological Constraints on the Evolution of Cooperation, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 60, 61
(2004), which distinguishes punishment from harassment.
77. Raoul A. Mulder & Naomi E. Langmore, DominantMales Punish Helpers for Temporary
Defection in Superb Fairy-Wrens, 45 ANIMAL BEHAV. 830, 831 (1993).
78. Hudson K. Reeve, Queen Activation of Lazy Workers in Colonies of the Eusocial Naked
Mole-Rat, 358 NATURE 147, 147-48 (1992).
79.

Marc Bekoff, Wild Justice, Cooperation, and FairPlay, in THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF

SOCIALITY 53, 62 (Robert W. Sussman & Audrey R. Chapman eds., 2004).
80. T.H. Clutton-Brock & G. A. Parker, Punishment in Animal Societies, 373 NATURE 209,
212 (1995).
81. Id. (citing Joanne Reiter, Nell Lee Stinson & Burney J. Le Boeuf, Northern Elephant
Seal Development: The Transitionfrom Weaning to NutritionalIndependence, 3 BEHAV. ECOLOGY
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sneak copulations with females being guarded by adult males are
82
regularly attacked.
With respect to an animal sense of fair treatment, a leading
researcher has concluded that a wide variety of animals is capable of
discerning when a situation is not equitable.8 3 For example, in a
recent and widely reported experiment with capuchin monkeys,
different combinations of two adjacent monkeys regularly alternated
returning granite tokens for cucumber slices. When the experimenter
began to provide one monkey with a grape (a more highly valued food)
in exchange for the same token that continued to yield mere
cucumbers for the other monkey, that other monkey often manifested
considerable distress. It sometimes jumped up and down, throwing the
token or the cucumber at the researcher, refusing to eat the cucumber,
and the like.8 4 This led the authors of the study to conclude that
capuchins are capable of comparing their own reward to the reward
others receive, and accepting or rejecting rewards according to their
relative, not absolute, value.8 5 Similarly, chimpanzees reportedly will
often refuse to participate in an exchange once another chimpanzee is
receiving a more valued reward for the same amount of effort.8 6 Thus,
both capuchins and chimpanzees behave in ways suggesting that they
can perceive unfairness and that it often agitates them.
Behavior suggesting an ability to perceive inequities appears to
underlie a great deal of social behavior in primates, in whom
transgressive acts are most systematically punished. By way of
background,
many
primates regularly exhibit sophisticated
cooperation, which ranges from simple reciprocal grooming and foodsharing to complex tool-using and coalitional behavior. For example,
in olive baboons there is a strong correlation between A's prior support
& SOCIOBIOLOGY 337, 344 (1978); Joanne Reiter, Kathy J. Panken & Burney J. Le Boeuf, Female
Competition and Reproductive Success in Northern Elephant Seals, 29 ANIMAL BEHAV. 670, 676
(1981)).
82. Clutton-Brock & Parker, supra note 80 (citing T.H. Clutton-Brock, S.D. Albon, R.M.
Gibson & F.E. Guinness, The Logical Stag: Adaptive Aspects of Fighting in Red Deer (Cervus
elaphus L.), 27 ANIMAL BEHAV. 211, 212 (1979); T.H. Clutton-Brock, D. Green, M. HiraiwaHasegawa & S.D. Albon, Passing the Buck: Resource Defence, Lek Breeding and Mate Choice in
Fallow Deer, 23 BEHAV. ECOLOGY & SOCIOBIOOLOGY 281, 287-88 (1988)).

83.

Sarah F. Brosnan, Nonhuman Species' Reactions to Inequity and Their Implications for

Fairness, 19 SOC. JUST. RES. 153, 181 (2006).

84. Sarah F. Brosnan & Frans B.M. de Waal, Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay, 425 NATURE
297, 298 (2003); Sarah Brosnan & Frans de Waal, Reply, Animal Behavior: Fair Refusal by
Capuchin Monkeys, 428 NATURE 140, 140 (2004) [hereinafter Brosnan & de Waal, Reply].
85. Bosnan & de Waal, Reply, supra note 84.
86. Brosnan, supra note 83, at 177; Sarah F. Brosnan, Hillary C. Schiff & Frans B.M. de
Waal, Tolerance for Inequity May Increase with Social Closeness in Chimpanzees, 272 PROC.:
BIOLOGICAL Sci. 253, 255 (2005).
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in a conflict for a fellow baboon B, and A's successful recruitment of B
to a new conflict in which A becomes involved.8 7 In macaques,
individuals have been observed to support unrelated others, who have
previously supported them by intervening in conflicts on their
behalf 8 8 Vervet monkeys tend to groom preferentially individuals who
have groomed them in the past.8 9 When one chimpanzee grooms
another, early in the day, the latter is more likely to share food with
the former, later in the day. 90 And chimpanzees experimentally
engaged in tasks requiring collaboration quickly determine which
among different potential collaborators is most effective and recruit
that individual preferentially for subsequent collaborative tasks. 9 1
On the other hand, failure to cooperate regularly yields sharp
consequences. Negative acts are the flip side of the cooperation coin.
Authors of a leading paper on the subject conclude that the intensity
of punishments often increases with the severity of harm caused by
transgressors.9 2 For example, rhesus macaques who discover food and
are caught having failed to alert the group to its discovery often
become targets of significant aggression.9 3 In chimpanzee societies,
those reluctant to share when they have food are more likely to
encounter aggressive responses when they later approach those who
have food. 94 Chimpanzees will attack former allies who failed to assist
them in conflicts with third parties. 95 And many primates, including
chimpanzees, tend to intervene most often against those who have

87.
88.

C. Packer, ReciprocalAltruism in PapioAnubis, 265 NATURE 441, 442 (1977).
Jessica C. Flack & Frans B.M. de Waal, "Any Animal Whatever"*DarwinianBuilding

Blocks of Morality in Monkeys and Apes, in

EVOLUTIONARY ORIGINS OF MORALITY: CROSS-

DISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 1, 12 (Leonard D. Katz ed., 2000); Frans B.M. de Waal & Lesleigh
M. Luttrell, The Similarity Principle Underlying Social Bonding Among Female Rhesus
Monkeys, 46 FOLIA PRIMATOLOGICA 215 (1986).

89.

See Robert M. Seyfarth & Dorothy L. Cheney, Grooming, Alliances and Reciprocal

Altruism in Vervet Monkeys, 308 NATURE 541, 542 (1984).

90.

Frans B.M. de Waal, Food Sharing and Reciprocal ObligationsAmong Chimpanzees, 18

J. HUM. EVOLUTION 433, 433 (1989).

91. Alicia P. Melis, Brian Hare & Michael Tomasello, Chimpanzees Recruit the Best
Collaborators,311 SCIENCE 1297, 1299 (2006).
92. Clutton-Brock & Parker, supra note 80, at 211.
93. Marc D. Hauser, Costs of Deception: Cheaters Are Punished in Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca
mulatta), 89 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 12,137, 12,137 (1992); Marc D. Hauser & Peter Marler,

Food-Associated Calls in Rhesus Macaques (Macaca mulatta): II. Costs and Benefits of Call
Production and Suppression,4 BEHAV. ECOLOGY 206, 206 (1993).

94. De Waal, supra note 90, at 456; see also DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 160 (concluding
such behavior "suggests a sense of justice and fairness").
95.

FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG APES 207 (1998).
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most often intervened against them. 96 These patterns have prompted
leading researchers to refer to such negative reciprocities as a
"revenge system." 97
Indeed, among chimpanzees (who, along with bonobos, are the
closest relatives of humans) retribution is common enough that
researchers consider retaliation "an integral part of [a] system of
reciprocity."9 8 Because sharing and other cooperative behavior exists
in a "multi-faceted matrix of relationships, social pressures, delayed
rewards, and mutual obligations,"9 9 the most successful individuals
are those who can distinguish good colleagues from bad and deal with
each accordingly. Frans de Waal, a prominent primatologist,
consequently describes their community as "a 'market' of reward and
punishment," 10 0 with "balance sheets" on social interactions. 10 1 Indeed,
reciprocity rules consisted of" 'one good turn deserves another' and 'an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.'"102 "Not only are beneficial actions
rewarded," de Waal concludes, but "there seems to be a tendency to
teach a lesson to those who act negatively."'1 3 Reward good deeds and
punish the bad.
The data available, of which the foregoing is only a sample, do
not prove definitively that some core aspects of human intuitions of
justice are evolved adaptations. 10 4 Nor, even if they are adaptations,
did they necessarily arise from the same roots as related intuitions in

96. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 8; Joan B. Silk, The Patterning of Intervention
Among Male Bonnet Macaques: Reciprocity, Revenge, and Loyalty, 33 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
318 (1992).

97.

See, e.g., Fillipo Aureli et al., Kin-oriented Redirection Among Japanese Macaques: An

Expression of a Revenge System?, 44 ANIMAL BEHAV. 283, 289-90 (1992) ('Macaques might have

an indirect revenge system in which kin relationships play a decisive role."); Frans B.M. de Waal
& Lesleigh M. Luttrell, Mechanisms of Social Reciprocity in Three Primate Species: Symmetrical
Relationship Characteristicsor Cognition, 9 ETHOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 101, 114 (1998) ("Only

this species exhibits what may be called a revenge system: chimpanzees tend to intervene
against individuals who intervene against themselves.").
98. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 157-58.
99. De Waal, supra note 90, at 452.
100. Id.
101. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 157-59.
102. DE WAAL, supra note 95; see also Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 9 ('Monkeys and
apes appear capable of holding received services in mind, selectively repaying those individuals
who performed the favours. They seem to hold negative acts in mind as well, leading to
retribution and revenge.").
103. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 159; see also Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 9
(describing similar behavior among monkeys and apes).
104. Indeed, some dispute whether primates actually use negative sanctions to shape
behavior of third parties or to punish deviation from social norms. Joan B. Silk, The Evolution of
Cooperation in Primate Groups, in MORAL SENTIMENTS AND MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE
FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 43, 60-64 (Herbert Gintis et al. eds., 2005).
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other species. However, indifference to wrongdoing in highly
cooperative species is exploited easily by cheaters and free-riders, and
therefore potentially unstable. 105 Consequently, one would expect
frequently to observe punishment (as well as retaliation, selective
ostracism, and the like) of wrongdoing in ultra-social species such as
ours. And the intersecting vectors of available animal evidence point
toward that conclusion. Moreover, the close relationship of humans,
chimpanzees, and other primates suggests that we ought not
gratuitously, uneconomically, and unparsimoniously assume that
there are different causes in humans for the same behaviors in other
animals.10 6 It is not surprising, then, that the leading animal
researchers believe that evolution has supplied the "building blocks" of
human morality1 0 7 and that the question is not whether biology has
influenced the development of human moral systems, but rather to
what degree.10 8 "Evolution," they believe, "has produced the requisites
for morality: a tendency to develop social norms and enforce them."'0 9
B. Brain Science Evidence
Some people may balk at the notion that intuitions of justice
could be the product of evolution, even indirectly, because views of
justice are obviously matters of complex judgment making. The design
of one's visual system might be the product of evolution, but how could
evolution affect a person's judgment concerning what punishment is
deserved?
Specialized brain structures and brain processes determine all
decisionmaking, no matter how complex. And neuroscience has begun
to provide details on what structures do what. As demonstrated below,

105. In game theoretic terms, a behavioral "strategy" is evolutionarily unstable if it can be
outcompeted by an alternative strategy. See generally JOHN MAYNARD SMITH, EVOLUTION AND
THE THEORY OF GAMES (1982).
106. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 64.
107. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 19-24; see also HAUSER, supra note 45 ("We can
safely assume that these intuitions evolved prior to or during our life as hunter-gatherers .... In
such small-scale societies, fairness was most likely an effective proxy for judging punishable
acts."); DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 218 ("The fact that the human moral sense goes so far back in
evolutionary history that other species show signs of it plants morality firmly near the center of
our ... nature.").
108. Flack & de Waal, supra note 88, at 3.
109. DE WAAL, supra note 39, at 39; see also RICHARD JOYCE, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY
140-42 (2006) (explaining the evolution of fairness); Sarah F. Brosnan, Fairness in Monkeys, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 288, 288-89 (Marc Bekoff ed., 2004); Brosnan, supra note
83, at 160-61; Brosnan & de Waal, Reply, supra note 84; Frans B.M. de Waal, The Chimpanzee's
Sense of Social Regularity and its Relation to the Human Sense of Justice, 34 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 335, 345-49 (1991).
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we now know that specific brain regions perform certain kinds of
reasoning tasks, and moral judgment, in particular, has been shown to
involve specific brain regions that interact differently depending on
the exact nature of the moral decision presented.
Contrary to prior assumptions, 110 we also know today that the
brain is anatomically and functionally specialized. Different parts of
the brain acting in varying combinations perform different
information-processing tasks that in turn influence a person's
behavior. Scientists have investigated the functions of different parts
of the human brain by observing what happens when different brain
locations are experimentally stimulated, different regions of the brain
are removed or damaged, or a person within a brain scanning device is
engaged in decisionmaking.
A wealth of experimental evidence demonstrates that artificial
stimulation of different areas of the brain affects perception, cognition,
and behavior differently. Using electrical stimulation in non-human
primates, for example, researchers have manipulated the activity of
small groups of neurons, ultimately establishing causal links between
the activities of those cells and specific aspects of perception or
cognition. 1 ' And with non-invasive stimulation studies on humans
(such as transcranial magnetic stimulation), researchers have
discovered predictable interference with different cognitive tasks
when the activity of a specific portion of the brain is disrupted
2
artificially. "1
With respect to discoveries arising from cases of brain damage,
consider the well-studied case of Phineas Gage, a reliable and
personable railroad worker of normal social disposition, who had a
metal tamping rod pass cleanly through his skull and brain after a
spark ignited the dynamite he was tamping into its hole. "1 3 The rod
removed Gage's medial prefrontal cortex and, although he appeared to
retain all of his essential mental faculties, he became bizarrely antisocial. 1 4 Similarly, a variety of recent studies have identified ways in
110. See generally PINKER, supra note 24, passim (discussing such assumptions). For more
on functional specialization, see STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS (1999).
111. Marlene R. Cohen & William T. Newsome, What Electrical Microstimulation has
Revealed about the Neural Basis of Cognition, 14 CURRENT OPINION NEUROBIOLOGY 169, 169-75
(2004) (providing overview of studies).
112. Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation in Cognitive
Neuroscience-VirtualLesion, Chronometry, and Functional Connectivity, 10 CURRENT OPINION
NEUROBIOLOGY 232 (2000).
113. ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 8-10

(2005) (describing Gage's injury and its effect on his social behavior).
114. Id.; Hanna Damasio, et al., The Return of Phineas Gage: Clues about the Brain from the
Skull of a Famous Patient,264 SCIENCE 1102 (1994).
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which relatively localized and discrete brain damage and lesions in
particular brain areas can result in severe impingement on the
acquisition of social knowledge, on social behavior, and on moral
reasoning. 115 For example, damage to the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex, particularly of a young child, renders that person morally
incompetent. 116 And a condition known as "acquired sociopathy" often
results from damage to the orbitomedial or polar frontal cortex, the
11 7
anterior temporal lobe, or the superomedial frontal lobe.
Even more significant are the results of brain imaging studies.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging ("fMRI"), which tracks both
locations and amplitudes of activity in the brain, 11 8 has shown that
specific parts of the brain-the orbital and medial sectors of the
prefrontal cortex, as well as the superior temporal sulcus, among
others1 9-- are involved in moral reasoning and also show how the
subareas work together in predictable ways during the process of
1 20
making a moral decision.
Not only does this work reveal the underappreciated extent to
which processes of evolution and development have yielded highly
specialized brain operations, evolutionary premises explicitly underlie
the hypotheses of some of the most significant studies of moral
decisionmaking. For example, Joshua Greene and colleagues started
from the premise that elements of basic emotions (such as fear,
115. Joshua Greene, Cognitive Neuroscience and the Structure of the Moral Mind, in THE
INNATE MIND: STRUCTURE AND CONTENTS 338, 339-41 (Peter Carruthers et al. eds., 2005).
116. DAMASIO, supra note 113, at 61 (describing defect in the ability to reason about choices
and to make socially and ethically appropriate ones based on that reasoning).
117. Jorge Moll et al., Morals and the Human Brain: A Working Model, 14 NEUROREPORT
299, 300 (2003). Other implicated areas include "certain related subcortical neuclei, particularly
the amygdala, ventromedial hypothalamus, dorsomedial thalamus, and head of the caudate
nucleus or anterior limb of internal capsule." Id.
118. Useful introductions include: SCOTT A. HUETTEL ET AL., FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC
RESONANCE IMAGING (2004); MICHAEL I. POSNER & MARCUS E. RAICHLE, IMAGES OF MIND (1997).
119. See, e.g., Jorge Moll et al., The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions, 22 J. NEUROSCIENCE
2730 (2002).
120. See Greene, supra note 115 (discussing "moral centers" of the brain and how they work
together); Qian Luo et al., The Neural Basis of Implicit Moral Attitude-An MAT Study Using
Event-Related fMRI, 30 NEUROIMAGE 1449, 1455-57 (2005) (providing useful bibliography); Moll
et al., supra note 117. Other important works include Oliver R. Goodenough, Mapping Cortical
Areas Associated with Legal Reasoning and Moral Intuition, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 429 (2001);
Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific Approach to Normative Judgment in
Law and Science, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1709 (2004); Joshua Greene &
Jonathan Haidt, How (and Where) Does Moral Judgment Work?, 6 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 517
(2002); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral
Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105 (2001); Joshua D. Greene et al., The Neural Bases of Cognitive
Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment, 44 NEURON 389 (2004); Hauke R. Heekeren et al., An
fMRI Study of Simple Ethical Decision-making, 14 NEUROREPORT 1215 (2003).
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jealousy, and anger) are evolved short cuts to behaviors that were
adaptive for their bearers, on average, in deep ancestral
environments. That is, compared to more cumbersome analysis and
deliberation, emotions are generally "reliable, quick, and efficient"
121
ways of solving commonly encountered circumstances.
These researchers therefore predicted that the more closely a
moral scenario aligns with regular features of ancestral environments,
the more likely it is to invoke evolved emotional reactions, rather than
dispassionately cognitive and deliberative ones. And the results were
consistent with those predictions. Specifically, more physically
personal dilemmas, such as whether to push one person into harm's
way, thereby deflecting that harm from several people, yields greater
activity in the brain areas associated with emotions, while a less
personal but analogous dilemma, such as whether to throw a switch
that would deflect an oncoming harm onto one person instead of
several, yields greater activity in a different brain area, associated
122
with less passionate analysis and calculation.
Of course, such evidence does not suggest that there is a single,
evolved, discretely boundaried "morality module" in the brain. 123 The
situation is more complex. Some of the regions associated with moral
decisionmaking are also associated with other brain activities. But
what is clear is that an identifiable subset of the brain's regions,
despite anatomical dissociability, are regularly and intimately
networked in assessing moral dilemmas. And the interaction of these
regions changes predictably as the nature of the moral dilemma
24
changes.1
In another study, researchers found that people make faster
decisions, and with less activity in the deliberating temporal poles,

121. Joshua Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul, in THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY:
EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming

Jan. 2008) (manuscript at 33 available at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/-jgreene/GreeneWJH/
Greene-KantSoul.pdf.).
122. Specifically, the more personal dilemma generated comparatively greater activity in the
posterior cingulate cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex, and the superior temporal sulcus.
Greene, supra note 115, at 346.
123. See, e.g., Jana Schaich Borg et al., Consequences, Action, and Intention as Factors in
Moral Judgments: An fMRI Investigation, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 803, 816 (2006) ("Our
data highlight that morality is not represented in one place in the brain, but instead is mediated
by multiple networks."); Greene, supra note 115, at 349 ("[IMt is clear from these studies that
there is no 'moral center' in the brain, no 'morality module.' "); Greene & Haidt, supra note 120,
at 522 ("What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that there is no specifically moral part
of the brain."),
124. See sources cited supra note 123.
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when moral scenarios involve bodily harm than when they do not. 125
Another study showed significantly greater activity in the right
amygdala, left medial orbitofrontal cortex, and medial frontal gyrus
when subjects were shown interpersonal violence than when shown
vandalism or violence to objects. 126 Compared to scenarios with
unintentional harm, scenarios involving intentional harm yield
greater activity in areas associated with emotion (such as the
orbitofrontal cortex and the temporal pole) with correspondingly less
activity in areas associated with deliberative cognition (such as the
angular gyrus and superior frontal gyrus).1 27 Moral scenarios in which
action and inaction result in the same amount of harm yield greater
activity in areas associated with deliberative cognition (such as the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and correspondingly less activity in
areas associated with emotion (including the orbitofrontal cortex and
temporal pole) than do analogous nonmoral scenarios. This suggests
that "[i]ndividuals will utilize varying combinations of cognitive and
emotive facilities to address moral challenges, but, overall, certain
types of moral scenarios are likely to be processed in characteristic
ways.' 128 Further, removing emotive components of decisionmaking
does not render people hyper-ethical, it instead renders them "unable
to feel the rightness and wrongness of simple decisions and
29
judgments."1
This area of research is relatively new. Nevertheless, the
foregoing, in conjunction with other studies, has led a variety of
researchers to conclude that our moral intuitions are built on evolved
and widely shared building blocks. 130 Marc Hauser, for example,
concludes that the evidence points to "all humans [being] endowed
with a moral faculty."'131 Joshua Greene argues that the evidence
suggests that "the form of human moral thought is importantly
125. Hauke R. Heekeren et al., Influence of Bodily Harm on Neural Correlates of Semantic
and Moral Decision-Making,24 NEUROIMAGE 887 (2005).
126. Borg et al., supra note 123, at 808-11; Luo et al., supra note 120, at 1454.
127. Borg et al., supra note 123, at 803.
128. Id. at 815-16.
129. Jonathan Haidt & Fredrik Bjorklund, Social Intuitionists Answer Six Questions about
Moral Psychology, in 2 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION

AND DIVERSITY (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., forthcoming Jan. 2008) (manuscript at 17).
130. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 115, at 338-39 (discussing studies that help to reveal the
foundations of morality). For an overview of recent work on the biology of punishment, see Ben
Seymour, Tania Singer & Ray Dolan, The Neurobiology of Punishment, 8 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 300 (2007).

131. Marc Hauser et al., Reviving Rawls' Linguistic Analogy: Operative Principles and the
Causal Structure of Moral Actions, in 1 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY, THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY:

ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS
(manuscript at 1).

(Walter

Sinnott-Armstrong

ed.,

forthcoming

Jan.

2008)
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shaped by the innate structure of the human mind and that some
basic, prosocial tendencies probably provide human morality with
innate content." 132 And both argue that, while moral decisionmaking is
networked, rather than unitary, it is networked in a way distinctly
analogous to the brain's innate grammar (which is the basic grammar
design one is born with and which underlies all human languages
despite regional cultural variation). 133 That is to say, these authors
and others conclude that the basic moral sentiments humans share
34
are products of evolutionary processes. 1
C. Child Development Evidence
The child development literature provides much collateral
support for the evolutionary theory offered in Part II. First, there is
evidence that children's intuitions of justice progress through
consistent stages of development across cultures. In the same way
that baby teeth grow from gums and adult teeth replace baby teeth,
intuitions about morality and justice seem to develop according to a
relatively predictable sequence. Second, the cognitive skills that
underpin these intuitions are precocious, with children able to make
important conceptual distinctions relevant to morality and justice at
young ages. Finally, the content of the intuitions of justice tracks the
core intuitions discussed above, with injury, theft, and fairness being
among the first principles of justice understood by young children.
1. Predictable Stages of Development
There is a great deal of data about the development of moral
reasoning in children. The classic-if somewhat dated-body of
research in the area is Lawrence Kohlberg's work, 135 recently
described as "the most widely researched description of moral
development available." 136 Kohlberg's view is that people go through a
132. Greene, supra note 115, at 351.
133. Id. at 350-51; Hauser et al., supra note 131; see PINKER, supra note 34.
134. For example, Haidt and Bjorklund argue that "moral beliefs and motivations come from
a small set of intuitions that evolution has prepared the human brain to develop .. " Haidt &
Bjorklund, supra note 129 (manuscript at 2). Greene & Haidt, supra note 120, at 517, conclude
that moral intuitions "are shaped by natural selection, as well as by cultural forces."
135. See, e.g., 2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Lawrence Kohlberg, From Is to Ought: How to Commit the
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development, in COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY (Theodore Mischel ed., 1971); see also 1 ANNE COLBY &
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1987);
LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE MEASURE OF MORAL JUDGMENT (1987).
136. LARRY P. NUCCI, EDUCATION IN THE MORAL DOMAIN 81 (2001).

2 ANNE COLBY &
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predictable sequence of phases of moral thinking. 137 As Jerome Kagan
suggests, one would expect this if the capacity for learning moral
reasoning were like the capacity for learning language. 138 That is,
reliable, consistent, cross-situational development is a hallmark of the
existence of a specific set of psychological mechanisms designed for a
particular function by natural selection.139
For our purposes, it is not important whether Kohlberg's
scheme is the best way of describing the various stages of

137. This view parallels Piaget's views on development.

See generally 1 LAWRENCE

KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981)

(linking cognitive and moral development).
138. Jerome Kagan, Introduction to THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN ix,
ix-x (Jerome Kagan & Sharon Lamb eds., 1987).
139. Kohlberg believed that as children develop more sophisticated ways of thinking (for
example, from the concrete to the abstract, see BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH
OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE xxiii-xxiv (1958), which describes
early work of Inhelder and Piaget studying the development of intelligence in humans), they also
develop more sophisticated moral conceptualizations. Kohlberg's sequence is divided into three
"levels" each with two "stages." His view might be summarized as:
Description of Moral Behavior
Stage
Level
(age range)
Conform to norms because of potential for punishment by
Obedience/
Pre-conventional
authority figures.
Punishment
(5-10)

Conventional

Individualism/
Exchange
Good/Bad

Do what is "good" (i.e., feels good) for the self. This includes
beneficial exchanges with others.

Law and Order
Social Contract

Behave so as to discharge one's duty as part of the social order.
Acting in a way that benefits others because of rationally-based
laws/norms in a society. Individual rights and utilitarianism.

Behave so as to elicit approval from others.

(10-14)

Post-Conventional
(14-adult)

"Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency."
(Quotations from KOHLBERG, supra note 137, at 16-19, 24-25, 409-12, are used for the stage
name and description because it is difficult to gloss these ideas.) Kohlberg argued that people
universally progressed from lower to higher stages of moral development. He did not argue that
everyone reached the highest stage, "universal ethical principle orientation." The early stages,
the "pre-conventional" stages, commonly from ages five through ten, are essentially about selfinterest. The intermediate "conventional" levels, commonly ages ten through fourteen, in
contrast, reflect an awareness of the benefits of having a positive reputation as a moral agent
and of fulfilling one's duties in the context of social exchange. The highest level, the "postconventional" stages, commonly from ages fourteen onward, includes a genuine interest in
others' welfare, a respect for others' rights, and a recognition of universal moral principles. More
recent approaches to Kohlberg's model maintain the idea that stages are reached in sequence,
but instead of one stage "replacing" another, each stage is seen as supplementing the logic of
previous stages. Dennis L. Krebs & Kathy Denton, Toward a More Pragmatic Approach to
Morality: A CriticalEvaluation of Kohlberg's Model, 112 PSYCHOL. REV. 629, 633 (2005). On this
view, a person who has reached Stage 4 will still use Stage 3 reasoning in circumstances where
doing so is useful or desirable. Id. at 645.
"Universal
ethical principle
orientation"
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development. What is significant is the evidence, particularly from
recent research (see below), of a predictable developmental path for all
humans, however that path might be conceptualized and described. To
the extent that children everywhere progress through similar stages of
moral reasoning about justice at roughly the same ages, our
evolutionary explanation for the origins of intuitions of justice receives
collateral support. 140 As suggested by Kagan, "temporal concordance
implies a biologically based preparedness to judge acts as right or
wrong, where preparedness is used with the same sense intended by
linguists who claim that two-year-old children are prepared to speak
14 1
their language."'
Imagine the reverse case. If there were no specific
developmental system for the acquisition of moral intuitions, if
intuitions of justice were simply a matter of general social learning,
then the developmental route of the acquisition of intuitions of justice
would depend on the environment in which the child developed. The
things that the child learned were wrong would include acts the child
witnessed, ideas communicated through language, pedagogy from
various sources, and so forth. Because all of these elements are likely
to differ widely across cultures, and even across family and peer
groups within cultures, such a general learning system would yield
very different paths and timing in the acquisition of intuitions of
142
justice for different individuals.
2. Making Subtle and Complex Judgments at an Early Age
Early research in this area seems to have vastly
underestimated the sophistication of children. More recent research
demonstrates that children are able to make far more sophisticated
judgments and much finer distinctions than those predicted by
Kohlberg's proposed sequence. Although evidence now suggests that
moral reasoning develops relatively early, it is likely that research
14 3
still does not fully reveal the precociousness of moral reasoning.
John Darley and Thomas Shultz suggest in their broad review that
"children are capable of making moral judgments at a much earlier
140. The first evolutionary perspective on Kohlberg's work of which we are aware appears in
ALEXANDER, supra note 61, at 131-39.

141. Kagan, supra note 138, at x.
142. For a fuller discussion of general social learning as an alterative explanation, see infra
Part IV.
143. See Lawrence Kohlberg, A Current Statement on Some Theoretical Issues, in LAWRENCE
KOHLBERG: CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY 485, 491 (Sohan Modgil & Celia Modgil eds., 1986);

see also John M. Darley & Thomas R. Shultz, Moral Rules: Their Content and Acquisition, 41
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 525, 537 (1990).
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age than previously thought."144 Summarizing recent literature, the
authors conclude that "moral capacity is well developed although by
no means completely developed in the third year of life." 145 The
precocious abilities of young children support the evolutionary
argument in Part II. To the extent that very young children have
intuitions, acquire knowledge, and make conceptual distinctions,
especially universally, the probability that each child acquires these
by general learning processes decreases, and a more innate
developmental sequence becomes more likely. 146
a. DistinguishingMoral, Conventional, and PrudentialRules
In one early and crucial experiment, Judith Smetana tested
very young children's beliefs about justice to determine if they make
distinctions between violations of moral rules-acts that are wrong
and deserve punishment (for example, one child hitting another)-and
violations of conventional rules-acts that deviate from a convention
(for example, failing to say grace before a snack). 147 Smetana used
pictures indicating the acts to demonstrate violations. To elicit
responses, a pictorial scale (different-size frowns) was used to gauge
seriousness. Smetana also used a verbal assessment of how harshly
the offender should be punished: not at all, a little, or a lot. One group
of subjects consisted of children between two-and-a-half to roughly
three-and-a-half years old. The other group consisted of children
between roughly three-and-a-half and almost five years old. Moral
offenses included both physical harm (hitting) and theft (taking
someone else's apple). Both groups indicated that the moral
transgressions were more serious and deserved more punishment
than the conventional transgressions. The children indicated that the
moral offenses, compared with the violations of convention, would be
wrong even if "there [were] no rule about it."148
These results suggest that even very young children
distinguish moral wrongs from violations of convention and apply a
different logic to them. Moreover, children seem to consider moral

144. Darley & Shultz, supra note 143, at 552.
145. Id.

146. We take "innate" ideas to be those ideas that develop reliably in each member of the
species given the broad range of plausible environments in which the organism develops. That is,
an idea is innate if it does not rely on very general processes such as induction or social
transmission for its acquisition.
147. See Judith G. Smetana, Preschool Children's Conceptions of Moral and Social Rules, 52
CHILD DEV. 1333, 1333-34 (1981).
148. Id. at 1334-35.
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offenses to be serious: the majority of subjects in both groups rated the
moral offenses as a four on the four-point scale. When tested two to
three weeks later, subjects responded much as they had earlier,
149
suggesting a consistency in judgments.
The importance of these results should not be underestimated.
The fact that such young children believe immoral acts are wrong,
even in the absence of rules, indicates a precocious, universalist view
of morality. 150 In sharp contrast, children believe that conventions
apply to a particular group at a particular time and can be changed.
According to Judith Dunn, the evidence suggests that "by three and
four years old, children respond differently to different kinds of rule
breaking or transgression" and that "[a]lthough the data do not show
unambiguously a clear distinction between transgressions of social
convention and of moral standards, they demonstrate that three-yearolds are sensitive to different kinds of cultural breach." 151 Other
scholars take a stronger view:
[C]hildren at early ages... judge moral issues to be obligatory, applicable across like
situations, not contingent on specific social rules or authority-dictates, and not alterable
on an arbitrary basis. They judge conventions as contingent on social organization52
such as rules, authority, and existing arrangements.'

Somewhat older children similarly distinguish between moral
rules and "prudential rules"-rules that are in place to protect people
from harm (for example, a rule prohibiting climbing on the back of a
sofa). Marie Tisak and Elliot Turiel gave children (average ages of the
groups were roughly seven, nine, and eleven) stories about acts that
violated either moral rules (regarding theft or hitting) or prudential
rules (regarding running and falling). 153 Subjects reported that the
violation of the moral rule was more wrong and that it would be more

149. Test-retest reliability was .66 for the fourteen subjects so tested, a reasonable number
by traditional standards in experimental developmental psychology. Id. at 1334.
150. See Judith G. Smetana et al., Preschool Children's Judgments about Hypothetical and
Actual Transgressions,64 CHILD DEV. 202, 211 (1993) (reporting on a study that found preschool
children differentiate between moral and conventional transgressions, finding moral
transgressions more generally wrong regardless of the existence of rules).
151. Judith Dunn, The Beginnings of Moral Understanding:Development in the Second Year,
in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 91, 93.

152. Elliot Turiel, Melanie Killen & Charles C. Helwig, Morality: Its Structure, Functions,
and Vagaries, in THE EMERGENCE OF MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 155,

170; see also Jonathan Haidt et al., Affect, Culture, and Morality, or Is It Wrong to Eat Your
Dog?, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 613, 621 (1993) (observing that children ten to twelve

years old across the cultures investigated think that pushing another child off a swing should be
punished and that this behavior would be wrong in other countries as well).
153. Marie S. Tisak & Elliot Turiel, Children's Conceptions of Moral and Prudential Rules,
55 CHILD DEV. 1030, 1031 (1984).
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wrong to change moral rules.' 54 In other words, it is more acceptable
for the prudential rule to be modified. The comparison between moral
rules and prudential rules indicates judgments that go beyond
consideration of consequences of rule-violating actions. Again, the
results of Tisak and Turiel suggest the development of nuanced views
at early ages.
b. Judging the Relative Seriousness of Wrongful Conduct
Studies suggest that even young children intuitively appreciate
the relative seriousness of different kinds of wrongful conduct and
that the sophistication of the distinctions they make increases with
age. One of the first principles of morality that children acquire is the
idea that it is wrong to hurt others. 15 5 By age three, they understand
this principle, 156 and by age four, they take into account the
foreseeability of harm.' 57 As Philip Zalazo and his colleagues put it:
"substantive concepts of harm and welfare, however acquired, are
15 8
guiding moral judgments by the fourth year of life."
Findings also indicate that "children consider moral
transgressions resulting in physical harm to be more wrong than
moral transgressions resulting in property violations."1 59 A study by
Tisak and Turiel indicates that six-year-old children judge physical
violence as more serious than theft. 16 0 This suggests that children
have complex intuitions across different domains. Additional evidence
comes from studies in which children are asked to give examples of
moral transgressions. Children give physical acts of harm as the most
common examples.' 6' Acts of physical aggression are prototypical
62
moral violations to children.

154. Id. at 1028.
155. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 86; see also Kagan, supra note 138, at ix, xi.

156. Phillip David Zelazo et al., Intention, Act, and Outcome in Behavioral Prediction and
Moral Judgment, 67 CHILD DEV. 2478, 2479 (1996).
157. Sharon A.

Nelson-LeGall,

Motive-Outcome Matching and Outcome Foreseeability:

Effects on Attribution of Intentionality and Moral Judgments, 21 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 332,
336 (1985).
158. Zelazo et al., supra note 156, at 2488.
159. Marie S. Tisak et al., Preschool Children's Social Interactions Involving Moral and
PrudentialTransgressions:An Observational Study, 7 EARLY EDUC. & DEV. 137, 139 (1996).

160. Tisak & Turiel, supra note 153, at 1036.
161. Marie S. Tisak & Jeanne H. Block, Preschool Children's Evolving Conceptions of
Badness:A Longitudinal Study, 1 EARLY EDUC. AND DEV. 300, 300 (1990).
162. Id. at 305.
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Research on morality has shown that people cannot always
articulate the basis for their moral judgments. 163 Even adults are,
164
broadly, frequently unable to justify why they chose their actions
and it would be reasonable to expect children to have similar
limitations. Nonetheless, research shows that by age seven, children
can elaborate ideas about injury fairly well, and, when children make
judgments about blame and punishment, their ideas include a
165
calculation as to the intention of the person inflicting the injury.
This conclusion-that the first moral concept to appear in
children is that physical aggression is wrong-is relevant to our
argument. It is likely more than coincidence that this is also the first
step in our account of the evolutionary origins of intuitive justice.
In contrast, very young children might not have a firm grasp on
notions of fairness in exchange or social contracts. Young children
frequently announce that some outcome is "unfair." However, this
often means that the outcome is unfavorable to the speaker, rather
than violating a social contract or norm. 166 Nonetheless, William
Damon has suggested that young children can show "consistent,
patterned reasoning" about fair distribution of property, ownership,
167
and the like.
Scholars have argued that it is not until later in the
development of a child, perhaps around nine years of age, that adultlike conceptions of fairness emerge. 168 Indeed, Larry Nucci asserts
moral
of early-childhood
that "[t]he great accomplishment
development is the construction of moral action tied to structures of
'just' reciprocity." 169 Tangentially relevant is research showing that
young children (age five or less) allocate rewards equally, whereas
older children tend to allocate rewards with a proportionality (equity)

163. Haidt, The EmotionalDog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 42.
164. See WILLIAM HIRNSTEIN, BRAIN FICTION: SELF-DECEPTION AND THE RIDDLE OF
CONFABULATION (2005); Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 163 (concluding that subjects may not be

able to evaluate the mental processes underlying a response and instead rely on prior
perceptions of what would be an appropriate explanation).
165. See Dale T. Miller & C. Douglas McCann, Children's Reactions to the Perpetratorsand
Victims of Injustices, 50 CHILD DEV. 861, 866 (1979).
166. Nucci, supra note 136, at 86.
167. William Damon, Early Conceptions of Positive Justice as Related to the Development of
Logical Operations,46 CHILD DEV. 301, 302 (1975).
168. Larry Nucci, Because It Is the Right Thing to Do, 45 HUMAN DEV. 125, 128 (2002). Nucci
claims that at around age six, "children's moral judgments become regulated by conceptions of
just reciprocity." Id. When fairness and reciprocity emerge can be debated, but it looks as though
it is after intuitions regarding harm emerge.
169. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 87.
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rule, 170 suggesting a developmental trend in issues associated with
exchange (effort for reward).
The integration of multiple factors relevant to estimation of
seriousness also begins early, perhaps around age seven. In a study
performed by David Elkind and Ruth Dabek, children were divided
into groups based on age (average ages of the groups were roughly
five-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and nine). 171 The children listened to
stories about different crimes. The offense described in each story
varied in terms of whether it was intentional or not and whether the
damage was to a person or to property. The children then assessed
blame and were asked about punishment. On average, the children
viewed damage to a person as more serious, and they judged
intentional damage as more serious than non-intentional damage
(though this varied by age). Children of all ages viewed intentional
personal injury as more serious than unintentional property damage.
Interestingly, the youngest group of children (average age roughly
five-and-a-half) thought that unintentional personal injury was more
serious than intentional property damage, suggesting the importance
of personal injury. 172 This pattern was not found in the older children.
These results are mirrored in later work that suggests that while very
young children focus on either intention or harm, older children (age
four and five) use both harm and intention when making decisions
about punishment. 173 Such conclusions strongly imply that children
have sophisticated views on desert and possess the ability to weigh
multiple factors by age seven.
Charles Helwig and Urszula Jasiobedzka obtained similar
results by having children aged six, eight, and ten evaluate laws that
were either socially beneficial (such as traffic laws) or unjust (such as
age discrimination). 174 They found that all children, regardless of age,
considered "the perceived justice of the law, its social beneficial
purpose, and its potential for infringement on individual freedoms and

170. See Jay Hook, The Development of Equity and Logico-Mathematical Thinking, 49 CHILD
DEV. 1035, 1041 (1978); J.G. Hook & Thomas D. Cook, Equity Theory and the Cognitive Ability of
Children,86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 429, 441 (1979).

171. David Elkind & Ruth F. Dabek, Personal Injury and Property Damage in the Moral
Judgments of Children,48 CHILD DEV. 518, 519 (1977).

172. Id. at 521. There is evidence that even three-year-olds take intentions into account
when making judgments about actors. See Sharon A. Nelson, Factors Influencing Young
Children's Use of Motives and Outcomes as Moral Criteria,51 CHILD DEV. 823, 828-29 (1980).
173. Zalazo et al., supra note 156, at 2478-92.
174. See Charles C. Helwig & Urszula Jasiobedzka, The Relation Between Law and Morality:
Children's Reasoning about Socially Beneficial and Unjust Laws, 72 CHILD DEV. 1382, 1382
(2001).
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rights." 175 Helwig and Jasiobedzka concluded that "children apply
moral concepts of harm, rights, and justice to evaluate laws." 176 These
findings imply that children develop textured views of legal issues by
around age six.
c. Judging Blameworthiness with Factors beyond Offense Seriousness
Children's intuitions of justice are sophisticated enough to
include more than just an assessment of the seriousness of the
wrongful conduct. For example, they will take account of a person's
culpable state of mind-whether the violation was intentional or
accidental-as noted above. They also consider various exculpating or
mitigating circumstances. For example, the punishment judged to be
appropriate will change depending on the availability of information
regarding mitigating circumstances (i.e., the offender had a head
injury), an effect seen in experiments with children as young as seven
years old. 177 Summarizing their findings, Darley and Shultz conclude:
[RIesults indicated a fairly sophisticated use of a variety of the moral concepts by
children from 5 years of age. Children revealed evidence of knowing that judgments of
punishment presupposed judgments of moral responsibility and that moral
responsibility judgments presuppose causal judgments. They also used information on
intention and negligence to assign moral responsibility and information on restitution to
78
assign punishment.1

More recently, research on children's comprehension of
provoked harm versus unprovoked harm has revealed similar
nuances. Studies by Judith Smetana, Nicole Campione-Barr, and
Nicole Yell required children between the ages of six and nine to
examine
pictures
that
showed
provoked
and
unprovoked
transgressions involving either physical injury (hitting) or
psychological harm (teasing).179 The researchers concluded that
"[c]hildren judged hypothetical moral transgressions to be more
serious and more deserving of punishment, and they reasoned more
175. Id.

176. Id.
177. See John M. Darley et al., Intentions and Their Contexts in the Moral Judgments of
Children and Adults, 49 CHILD DEV. 66, 66 (1978) (finding evidence in children as young as six
that judgments regarding punishment vary depending on relevant circumstances, such as
provocation); Adrian Furnham & Steven Jones, Children's Views Regarding Possessions and
Their Theft, 16 J. MORAL EDUC. 18, 25-27 (1987); see also Cecilia Wainryb, Understanding
Differences in Moral Judgments: The Role of InformationalAssumptions, 62 CHILD DEV. 840, 847

(1991) (stating that new information can modify judgments of wrongness considerably among
people aged eleven to twenty-one).
178. Darley & Shultz, supra note 143, at 535.
179. Judith G. Smetana et al., Children's Moral and Affective Judgments Regarding
Provocationand Retaliation,49 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 209, 216-17 (2003).
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about concerns with others' welfare, for [unprovoked] than for
provoked transgressions and when retaliation involved hitting rather
than teasing."1 8 0 The researchers also found that "all children judged
that escalating the retaliatory response by hitting in response to being
teased ...was more serious and more deserving of punishment than
teasing in retaliation for either teasing or hitting," 18 1 suggesting that
children's understanding of morality and punishment includes the
view that physical injury is most egregious.
The sense of justice held by young children also incorporates a
feature present in adult intuitions of justice: the effect of a mistaken
belief of an offender. When children aged five and seven (but not
three18 2) make judgments regarding blame, they take into account the
fact that others might have incorrect beliefs.1 8 3 Their judgments are
quite nuanced. If a person's belief is different than the child's on
matters of fact-that is, beliefs concerning what is true (as opposed to
what is morally right)-then mitigation often is permitted.184
However, if the different belief relates to what is right and wrong (for
example, a teacher who thinks it is acceptable to discriminate against
someone based on gender), then the person's mistake does not
exculpate him.1 8 5 This implies that children have a sophisticated
understanding of others' beliefs and the role they play in the
commission of moral offenses. Further research demonstrates similar
18 6
results in older children.

180. Id. at 209.
181. Id. at 223.
182. A vast research enterprise shows that children under four years of age cannot
understand that others might have beliefs that are wrong or different from their own. That is
one possible reason for the developmental difference, having nothing to do with a change in
moral intuitions, but only more general abilities of understanding. See generally SIMON
BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS: AN ESSAY ON AUTISM AND THEORY OF MIND (1995); Alan M.

Leslie, Pretendingand Believing: Issues in the Theory of ToMM, 50 COGNITION 211 (1994); Alan
M. Leslie, Pretense and Representation: The Origins of Theory of Mind, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 412
(1987).
183. Cecilia Wainryb & Sherrie Ford, Young Children'sEvaluations of Acts Based on Beliefs
Different from Their Own, 44 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 484, 484 (1998).
184. Id. at 90-92.
185. Id.

186. See, e.g., Larry Nucci & Elsa K. Weber, Social Interactions in the Home and the
Development of Young Children's Concepts of the Personal, 66 CHILD DEV. 1438, 1445 (1995)

("[C] hildren differentiate personal issues from matters of moral or conventional regulation ....
");
Judith G. Smetana, Toddlers' Social Interactions regarding Moral and Conventional
Trasngressions, 55 CHILD DEV. 1767, 1774 (1984) ("[T]oddlers initiate responses to moral
transgressions . . . [and are] more likely to respond to moral than conventional transgressions
with emotional reactions, physical retaliation, and increasingly with age, statements regarding
the harm or injury caused.").
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Smetana and her colleagues summarize this research and
suggest that
by 4 years of age, middle-class, primarily European American children, as well as
African American preschoolers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, reliably evaluate
moral transgressions pertaining to physical or psychological harm and fairness as very
serious, deserving of punishment, generalizably wrong, and wrong regardless of whether
187
or not there is a rule or a teacher prohibits the act.

In short, even young children seem to have textured and
specific views regarding deserved punishment, and these views are
not derived simply from the dictates of authority.188
3. Cross-Cultural Developmental Studies
Substantial research demonstrates that the developmental
sequence for moral reasoning is not unique to the Western world.
Nucci suggests that "there is considerable cross-cultural evidence that
children and adults across a wide range of the world's cultures
conceptualize prototypical moral issues pertaining to fairness and
others' welfare in ways very similar to children and adults in Western
contexts, and differentiate such issues from prototypical matters of
convention." 18 9 In a recent review, Jenny Yau and Judith Smetana
conclude that despite cultural differences, "[c]hildren as young as 3
to 4 years of age have been found to treat moral transgressions as very
serious, generalizably wrong, and wrong independent of rules and
authority
sanctions.
In contrast,
they treat conventional
transgressions as less serious, contextually relative, and contingent on
rules and authorities."' 90
This last point, that children believe moral rules to be
universally applicable, bears expansion. As discussed above,' 91
children distinguish between fundamental issues of justice (e.g., the
belief that wrongdoing should be punished, property should not be
forcibly taken, and so on) and issues of convention or collateral
societal issues (e.g., objects over which individuals can be said to have

187. Smetana et al., supra note 179, at 210 (internal citations omitted).
188. See, e.g., Marsha D. Walton & Andrea J. Sedlak, Making Amends: A Grammar-Based
Analysis of Children's Social Interaction, 28 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 389 (1982) (suggesting
sophisticated understanding of transgressions among five-to-ten year olds in classroom settings,
including implicit knowledge of what others will think relevant to the way in which a
transgression is construed).
189. NUCCI, supra note 136, at 95-96.
190. Jenny Yau & Judith G. Smetana, Conceptions of Moral, Social-Conventional, and
Personal Events Among Chinese Preschoolers in Hong Kong, 74 CHILD DEV. 647, 647 (2003)
(internal citations omitted).
191. See, e.g., supra notes 147-58 and accompanying text.
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a property right). Children acknowledge that conventions could be
other than as they are and that if another group of people had a
192
different convention, it would not be "wrong."
The capacity of children to make this distinction is relevant to
the frequently cited argument that cultures differ in their morality,
found in Richard Schweder et al.'s cross-cultural investigation of the
relative rankings of wrongful acts as judged by Hindu Brahman
children. 19 3 Of the thirty-nine acts listed, the children judged the
following as the most serious wrong on the list: "[t]he day after his
father's death, the eldest son had a haircut and ate chicken."1 94 They
judged as one of the least serious transgressions-ranked thirty-fifth
of the thirty-nine-the case of a husband who beats a wife because she
repeatedly goes alone to the movies. These results may appear to
conflict with the notion of shared intuitions of justice; Western
children would make no such ranking. However, the rankings must be
understood in the context of the underlying beliefs held by the raters.
Because the father's soul is put in jeopardy by the son's act, the son's
act is judged as a most serious harm. Similarly, the raters'
understanding that the wife's act is a serious breach of a clear
contractual and social obligation helps explain why the husband's
beating of her is not ranked as more wrongful. In short, while
underlying intuitions regarding principles of justice may be similar,
different social conventions create different perceptions about the
wrongfulness of specific conduct. 195 As Cecelia Wainryb explains,
"what appears to be moral variation may be due not to diversity in
ethical concepts but rather to differences in informational
assumptions."'' 96 This point is important when judging the locus of
genuine variability in beliefs surrounding intuitions of justice.

192. Cf. Leigh A. Shaw & Cecilia Wainryb, The Outsider's Perspective: Young Adults'
Judgments of Social Practicesof Other Cultures, 17 BRIT. J. DEV. PSYCHOL. 451 (1999) (reaching

similar conclusions with a Chinese sample).
193. Richard A. Schweder et al., Culture and Moral Development, in THE EMERGENCE OF
MORALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN, supra note 138, at 1, 36-71.

194. Id. at 40.
195. See generally Turiel, Killen & Helwig, supra note 152, passim; Wainryb, supra note 177,
passim.
196. Wainryb, supra note 177, at 849. However, informational assumptions need not be
determinative. Id.; see also Cecilia Wainryb, Values and Truths: The Making and Judging of
Moral Decisions, in

RIGHTS AND WRONGS: How CHILDREN EVALUATE

THE WORLD,

NEW

DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD DEVELOPMENT 33, 33-46 (Marta Laupa ed., 2000) (arguing that the same
underlying moral values in adults and children, or adults in different cultures, can lead to
differing views on what is an immoral act because of different information about relevant facts).
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D. Summary of Evidence
Our hypothesis, that shared intuitions of justice derive in large
measure from the relentless effects of evolutionary processes on
human brains and consequent sentiments
and behavioral
predispositions, connects at a deep level with modern developments in
biology and psychology. The hypothesis also appears to explain why
these intuitions appear to be so stunningly consistent across our
species, so subtle in their complexities, and so non-randomly focused
on the harms to which their attention is particularly keen. We have
not, in this Part, attempted a definitive proof of our hypothesis.
Instead, we explored three different areas in which the data are
consistent with our hypothesis: animal studies, brain science, and
moral development.
The animal studies suggest that humans are not alone in
punishing violations of norms of cooperation, reciprocity, and fairness.
That so many social species exhibit these behaviors, and in such very
specific ways, suggests that there is an evolutionary and adaptive root
to these behavioral predispositions. This, in turn, suggests that
similar human behavior may stem from the same root. The data
further suggest that indifference to wrongdoing may in many species
be evolutionarily unstable. And this, in turn, suggests that intuitions
about punishment may frequently facilitate certain kinds of
cooperation, such as social exchange. Such intuitions require an
ability to perceive wrongful behavior, to remember transgressors, and
to treat them differently than non-transgressors. We not only see this
ability in many other social animals, but we also see it specifically in
contexts of inflictions of physical harm, the taking of resources, and
the violations of norms of reciprocity.
From the rapidly expanding field of brain science, we see how
the combination of evolutionary processes and organismal
development yields anatomically and functionally specialized human
brains, which tend to function very similarly in individuals across the
species. Damage to specific regions can result in dramatic social and
moral behavioral aberrations, which suggests that those areas of the
brain are sufficiently specialized to be necessary for social and moral
activity. Imaging studies reveal widely shared patterns in neural
activity, consistent with evolutionary hypotheses, when subjects are
confronted with various moral scenarios. More personal and
evolutionarily salient scenarios invoke various evolved behaviorbiasing computations to a greater extent than do alternative
scenarios. Far from responding with generic neural activity, human
brains are intriguingly similar and differentially focused when
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considering such things as bodily injury and violations of cooperation
norms. This evidence suggests that human brains have evolved the
specific capacity to process these kinds of transgressions in speciestypical, characteristic ways.
In the child development literature, experimental evidence
demonstrates that children understand that some acts are wrong and
deserve punishment at a very early age. Indeed, the intuition appears
to exist when children first are able to communicate these types of
ideas. The notion of physical injury as a wrong is among the first
elements to emerge in children, followed soon after by notions of
fairness and reciprocity. These intuitions become increasingly
textured as children grow older and change from simplistic notions of
strict equality to more sophisticated notions such as equity, which
take into account a person's capacities, contributions, and needs. Most
strikingly, growing evidence suggests that the development of these
rather sophisticated intuitions follow similar patterns cross-culturally,
though of course there remains important debate about the extent of
19 7
cross-cultural developmental similarities.
While no single study or field of research conclusively proves
our evolutionary hypothesis for the origins of shared intuitions of
justice, the triangulation of the theoretical foundations from biology
and psychology generally, alongside behavioral data in humans and
other species, recent studies of human brain operations, and broad
research into the characteristically human development of moral
psychology, presents a strong case.
IV. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: GENERAL SOCIAL LEARNING AND
EFFICIENT NORMS
Evolutionary explanations inevitably evoke the riposte that
perhaps the phenomenon in question is simply due to "learning" or
"culture." Could the consensus we have documented here be the result
of social learning rather than evolution?' 98 Perhaps the norms adopted
197. See Schweder et al., supra note 193.
198. Of course, any explanation for the very complex features of intuitions of justice must
include evolution by natural selection as part of their origin, including explanations based upon
social learning. The ability to learn is itself an evolved trait. See Tooby & Cosmides, supra note
29, at 119 (discussing the relationship between evolution and learning mechanisms). Thus, an
argument that groups discover efficient norms regarding justice (see below) requires an
evolutionary explanation for how the psychological mechanisms that perform this calculationwhether conscious or unconscious--came to exist. Similarly, an argument that people have a
predisposition for social learning must also have an evolutionary explanation for this highly
sophisticated, complex, functional capacity. In short, "learning" and/or "culture" do not obviate
evolutionary explanations; they necessitate them.
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simply reflect a human propensity to copy others' norms, hence the
observed consensus without the need for our evolutionary explanation.
Or, perhaps groups adopt the same norms because the norms are
efficient for all groups.
In one sense, the social learning claim-that shared intuitions
of justice are the product of social learning from the surrounding
culture-does not conflict with our evolutionary argument in Part II
because there we suggest that intuitions of justice are indeed
"learned" in a sense. Babies do not come into the world with intuitions
of justice intact; rather, they acquire them over time in a predictable
and largely sequential manner through interaction with their
environment. 199 In this sense, the evolutionary explanation envisions
some involvement of the surrounding culture, just as the special
human mechanism for acquiring language involves the surrounding
culture.
But non-evolutionary explanations go a step further. They
claim that intuitions of justice result entirely from general social
learning with no reliance upon an evolutionarily developed special
mechanism for acquiring intuitions of justice. In other words, the nonevolutionary explanations claim that people acquire views of justice in
the same way that they learn most other knowledge or come to most
other opinions. 20 0 That is, views of justice are learned, reasoned out, or
chosen through rational decisionmaking.
A. Spontaneous Social Learning
One non-evolutionary explanation, which might be called
''spontaneous social learning," might proceed as follows: the views of
justice on which there is so much agreement are those views that are

199. See supra Part III.C.1
200. The distinction we draw here is between an evolved "general" social learning ability,
which may result in, among many other things, the acquisition of intuitions of justice and an
evolved mechanism "specific" to acquiring intuitions of justice. We take it as uncontroversial that
a psychological system that acquires many different kinds of information from the social worlda general social learning system-is the product of evolution by natural selection. But the
narrow question is whether the system for acquiring intuitions of justice was designed by natural
selection for that relatively narrow function, as we argue is the best-reasoned conclusion, or was
designed to acquire information across a wide range of content domains. Evolutionary
psychologists refer to this distinction as between "domain specific" and "domain general" mental
systems. See, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 29, at 97 (arguing that framing psychological
issues in terms of how "domain specific" cognitive mechanisms are has been and will continue to
be productive in psychological research). For a discussion of tests for domain-specificity in the
context of logical reasoning, see Laurence Fiddick et al., No Interpretation Without
Representation: The Role of Domain-Specific Representations in the Wason Selection Task, 77
COGNITION 1, 2 (2002).
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most efficient for a group to hold, perhaps because they permit
productive social cooperation, much like the advantages we discuss in
the evolutionary account given in Part II. Notably, this explanation
relies on no special mechanism for the acquisition of intuitions of
justice. But this explanation for the shared views of justice faces
several difficulties.
1. Preferring Group Interests Over Individual Interests
This explanation depends on the individual's choice to adopt
views of justice that are efficient for the group. But there is little
reason to believe that people are predisposed toward preferring norms
that are efficient for the group, rather than norms that are efficient for
their own self interest. To make this explanation plausible, one would
have to show that people prefer what is good for the group over what
is good for themselves, a preference that the available data do not
support. 20 1 Instead, evidence from both the laboratory and the real
world support the view that when group interests are pitted against
self interest, what has been referred to as "social dilemmas," it is more
likely that self interest will prevail. 20 2 Acts of littering, pollution, overfishing, and limitless other examples are all cases in which people
20 3
choose to accommodate their own interests over those of the group.
In the lab, the question of self-interest-versus-group-interest
has been addressed by using "public goods" games or "commons
dilemma" games. In these games, people are put into groups and given
an allotment of money. Subjects can keep some or all of the money or
put some or all of it in a group pot. Money in the group pot is
multiplied by the experimenter at some rate and subsequently divided
among all the members of the group. Because money in the pot is
multiplied and subsequently split among the group members,
everyone in the group is made best off if everyone contributes all their
money to the group pot, making the "pie" everyone shares larger.
However, each person is individually better off by keeping his own
allotment of money for himself. With a few exceptions, 20 4 when people
play these games in the same group over time, they keep greater and

201. DAWKINS, supra note 21 (arguing that genes, rather than whole organisms, are the
entities on which natural selection acts and so, everything else equal, selection will act to favor
genes that cause their own replication as opposed to genes that cause individuals or groups or
ecologies to prosper).
202. Robyn Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 169 (1980).
203. SAMUEL S. KOMORITA & CRAIG D. PARKS, SOCIAL DILEMMAS (1996).

204. See, e.g., Robert Kurzban et al., Incremental Commitment and Reciprocity in a RealTime Public Goods Game, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1662 (2001).
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greater amounts of their endowment, reaching nearly purely selfish
behavior over time. 20 5 In short, when individual selfishness is pitted
against group interest in the lab, selfishness eventually wins.
2. Complexity of Determining Efficient Norms as Beyond Individual
Capacity
Even if people prefer a norm that is efficient for the group,
though not necessarily good for them personally, another challenge for
the spontaneous social learning explanation is that determining an
efficient norm is an exceedingly complex matter, probably well beyond
the capacity of an individual. Studies of human cognitive skills
confirm their limitations. Substantial experimental evidence suggests
that when people are presented with tasks that require the use of a
general ability to reason using the rules of formal logic, they typically
do not perform well. 20 6 Even in experiments in which the financial
stakes are very high, in which one might assume that people would
have an incentive to reason as logically and carefully as possible,
20 7
behavior deviates substantially from wealth-maximizing rationality.
As Herbert Simon put it: "[A]ctual human rationality-striving can at
best be an extremely crude and simplified approximation to the kind
20
of global rationality that is implied ... by game theoretical models." s
These limitations are illustrated vividly in Jared Diamond's
recent account of the failure of civilizations. 20 9 In these cases, the
human inability to foresee the consequences of the way that societies
organize themselves and to regulate the use of resources played
crucial roles in their eventual downfall. Among the Mayans and the
Easter Islanders, for example, the mismanagement of resources, due
to the inability to foresee how cultural practices would affect longterm growth and stability, played a central role in the collapse of those
civilizations. 210 This differs little from modern times, in which
205. John Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111-94 (J. Kagel & A. Roth eds., 1995).
206. Cosmides & Tooby, supra note 62, passim (arguing and providing evidence for the view
that humans do not perform well on tasks that require a general ability to use the rules of formal
logic).
207. For a brief discussion, see COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY:
EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 60-62 (2003) ('Mlultiplying the stake by two or ten
makes little difference .... ).
208. Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99, 101 (1955);
see also GERD GIGERENZER

& REINHARD SELTON,

BOUNDED RATIONALITY, THE ADAPTIVE

TOOLBOX (2002) (arguing that there are important constraints on human decision making,
making them only "boundedly rational").
209. JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: How SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005).
210. Id. at 177.
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economists reach little consensus on policies that will improve
economic growth because of the complexity of the system in question
and the limitation of human cognitive abilities to understand and
predict complex social systems. Diamond's analysis in many ways
continues analyses by economists such as Adam Smith and Friedrich
Hayek, 21 1 who argued that neither the aggregate decisions of a
democratic society nor the guiding hand of a dictator (for example,
2 12
among the Mayans) is sufficient.
In short, the spontaneous social learning explanation for the
agreement on views of justice is inconsistent with what is known
about the limits of human calculation, including the sharp limits on
the human cognitive capacity for deduction, the common human
tendency to rely on simplifying heuristics, and other limitations on
cognition. In contrast, the evolutionary explanation for intuitions of
justice that we offer in Part II involves a process that "tests"
alternative intuitional systems (or any other features of an organism)
through the sieve of natural selection. The feedback loop on genes
allows only a narrow range of developmental programs to be selected.
The spontaneous social learning explanation has no such power.
B. Accumulated Social Learning
One might try to save a social learning explanation from this
last flaw-that it is beyond the cognitive ability of a single individual,
or a single group-by altering the explanation in one respect. One
might argue that such efficient norms are not learned spontaneously
by each person or each group, but are the product of accumulated
social learning across several generations. That is, groups may move
toward efficient norms over many generations and may perpetuate
those norms because they are efficient and lead to success.
In a sense, this argument borrows the refinement mechanism
of evolutionary theory and makes it available to the general social
learning explanation. In other words, the claim is that groups with
efficient norms grow, do better, and spread their norms, and thus over
time there comes to be a great deal of agreement because of the

211. F. A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM (1989); ADAM SMITH, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Univ. Chi. Press 1976)
(1776).

212. DIAMOND, supra note 209, at 177 ("[W]e have to wonder why the kings and nobles failed
to recognize and solve these seemingly obvious problems undermining their society .... Like
most leaders throughout human history, the Maya kings and nobles did not heed long-term
problems, insofar as they perceived them.").
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diffusion of the efficient norms. 213 The explanation is "evolutionary" in
that it involves change over time, with less successful norms losing out
to more successful ones. However, it differs from the evolutionary
explanation in Part II, of course, because here the selection occurs
through the operation of social learning, rather than through gene
selection. 2 14 But this revised social learning explanation, which might
be called "accumulated social learning," still faces serious difficulties.
1. Absence of Variation in Intuitions of Justice Among Groups Despite
Large Differences in Situation and Culture
There exist vast differences in ecology, history, demographics,
social structure, and many other variables from one group and culture
to another. These differences are so striking and of such a nature that
it seems odd that all groups would find the same norms to be the most
efficient and, further, that each group would be equally effective in
teaching these norms to each successive generation. It would be
surprising if dramatic differences in social structure and social
resources had no effect on how, when, and what a generation would

213. This type of view has its historical roots in the writings of anthropologists who
developed ideas surrounding "functionalism," the notion that societal institutions keep the
society working. The founders of the most relevant areas of this discipline are Emile Durkheim
and Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN
SOCIETY (Free Press 1984) (1893); ALFRED REGINALD RADCLIFFE-BROWN, STRUCTURE AND
FUNCTION IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETY (1952).
In the more modern anthropological literature, this is referred to as "cultural group selection."
See, e.g., Joseph Soltis et al., Can Group-functional Behaviors Evolve by Cultural Group
Selection? An Empirical Test, 63 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 473, 474 (1995) (extending
functionalist arguments with a formal analysis and ethnographic evidence). For a recent,
comprehensive treatment of this and related issues, see PETER J. RICHERSON & ROBERT BOYD,
NOT BY GENES ALONE: How CULTURE TRANSFORMED HUMAN EVOLUTION (2005).
214. Learning models are more sophisticated than we allude to here, but beyond the scope of
the present discussion. Probably two of the most important transmission models of this type are
based on 1) conformity to the most common norm and 2) imitation of those who are of high
prestige. For a discussion of the former, see ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND
THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 205-40, 259-79 (1985) and Joseph Henrich & Robert Boyd, The
Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence of Between-group Differences, 19
EVOLUTION & HuM. BEHAV. 215, 231-37 (1998). For a discussion of the latter, see Joseph Henrich
& Francisco Gil-White, The Evolution of Prestige:Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism for
Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission, 22 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 165, 180-92
(2001), which argues that there are benefits to deferring to people who are successful in an
environment so that one can learn from these individuals. See also Robert Boyd & Peter J.
Richerson, Group Beneficial Norms Can Spread Rapidly in a Structured Population, 212 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 287, 288-89 (2002) (using evolutionary game theory to argue that
beneficial social norms spread quickly through populations); Joseph Henrich, Cultural Group
Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-scale Cooperation,53 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 3, 431 (2004) (presenting a formal model explaining how cultural group selection can lead to the
spread of norms for prosocial behavior, including the punishment of norm violators).
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learn about justice from each previous generation. One would expect
some groups to be better than others at approximating the efficient
norm and some groups to be better than others at teaching that
approximation to the succeeding generation.
Yet, as we documented in Part I, there is a consensus on the
core intuitions of justice even across demographics and cultures. How
could one explain this consensus if those views simply reflect the
efficient norm for each group? This seems a difficult task. It would
require finding a set of conditions that are universal to all human
groups, no matter their circumstances and culture, and showing that
it is these universal conditions alone that set the efficient norms for
the group's views of justice. If any factor, other than these universal
conditions, had influence in shaping the core views of justice, then one
would find differences between groups according to the differences of
these non-universal factors. Perhaps others will take up this
challenge-finding these universal conditions and showing how these
alone determine core views of justice-but until such can be found, or
even imagined, it would seem to make the spontaneous social learning
explanation implausible. In contrast, the evolutionary explanation
suffers no such problem. Evolutionary explanations, dependent as
they are on evolutionarily evolved mechanisms that all humans share,
215
fit naturally with human universals.
2. Inconsistency with Developmental Data
Even more problematic for the accumulated social learning
explanation is that it simply does not fit the developmental data
summarized in Part III.C. For example, we know that children's views
of morality emerge early and are nuanced from a young age. Recall
that even very young children-around three years of age-are
precocious universal moralists, believing that certain offenses are
wrong, even if there were no rule about the act, and distinguish moral
rules from rules of convention. In particular, children believe that
unprovoked physical harm is wrong and, further, very young children
distinguish among offenses (harm versus theft) and take intent and

215. See DONALD BROWN, HuMAN UNIVERSALS (1989) (discussing the relationship between
evolutionary biology and human cultural universals and suggesting that "human biology is a key
to understanding many human universals" and that "evolutionary psychology is a key to
understanding many of the universals that are of greatest interest to anthropology"); see also
John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, On the Universality of Human Nature and the Uniqueness of the
Individual: The Role of Genetics and Adaptation, 58 J. PERSONALITY 17, 23-24 (1990) (arguing
that the process of evolution by natural selection leads to a universal "design" for any given
species, including humans, leading to many universal physiological and psychological features).
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evaluating
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into
circumstances
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2 16
blameworthiness for violations, suggesting nuanced views of justice.
If views of justice were the result of social learning, one would
expect that young children would have to be taught distinctions such
as those between precautionary rules and moral rules. 217 But it seems
implausible that these abstractions could be taught to such young
children, who appear to come to these important distinctions
precociously. 218 The development of these intuitions seems to parallel
more closely, for example, the growth of teeth than learning to play
chess. Like teeth, these intuitions simply develop according to a preprogrammed timetable for all children, as opposed to chess, which
must be taught systematically and over time with explicit instruction.
Indeed, chess has a small number of rules, as compared to the
intricacies of moral judgment, and yet the learning of morality,
somewhat paradoxically, seems to come much more easily and
naturally to children than learning chess.
It is of course not impossible that children's ideas about wrongs
and punishment are transmitted to them by parents and peers while
they are young. It is significant, however, that these intuitions come
online across children in a reliably developing sequence at roughly the
same time throughout the world, without differences reflecting the
varied practical, social, and cultural conditions. That suggests these
intuitions are part of a specific, developed learning mechanism, rather
than the result of general social learning, which is necessarily
dependent upon the child's environment, which in turn differs
substantially from place to place.
3. Intuitional Knowledge as Having Distinct Characteristics from
Learned Knowledge
Even if the social learning explanation were consistent with
the developmental data, it nonetheless would be problematic. It is
inconsistent with what we know about the nature of views of justice:
their intuitional nature. If views of justice were learned from others,
one would expect such views to have the character of other learned
knowledge. That is, a social learning explanation assumes that our
judgments about justice are like many other judgments that we make
in our daily lives, such as how fast to drive on a stretch of road, how
long to cook a sandwich in the microwave, or how carefully to take

216. See supra Part III.C.
217. See supra Part III.C.2.a.
218. See supra Part III.C.2.
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notes on a lecture. These judgments, we assume, are the product of
reasoning, promoted by life experience and education.
But social science evidence suggests that judgments about
justice, especially for violations that might be called the core of
criminal wrongdoing, are more the product of intuition than
reasoning. Their intuitional nature means, among other things, that
they are judgments quickly arrived at (even by people with little
education or life experience), that they frequently are held with strong
feelings of certainty, and that the reasons we hold such judgments are
generally not consciously accessible to us.
In Jon Haidt's work on "moral dumbfounding," for example,
people report strong intuitions about things that are morally wrong,
such as consensual, non-reproductive incest, but are unable to provide
a principled explanation for their judgments. 2 19 Similarly, Marc
Hauser, Liane Young, and Fiery Cushman looked at judgments of
morally permissible actions using the trolley problem, 220 in which a
certain number of people can be saved from being killed by a runaway
trolley if some action is taken (or not taken), resulting in the death of
a smaller number of people, often a single individual. People are asked
what choice should be made in these difficult situations and to explain
their reasoning. While subjects commonly have strong and clear views
on the proper result, they also commonly are unable to offer an
explanation for their conclusions. For example, in one variation of the
trolley problem, the subject can avoid the death of five people on the
track by (a) pushing a bystander on the track whose body and
backpack will jam the trolley's wheels, stopping it, or (b) throwing a
switch to divert the trolley to a side track where it will kill one person.
Despite the fact that the results of the two actions are identical,
eighty-nine percent of the subjects considered the latter action moral
but only eleven percent judged the former to be moral. More
interesting for our purposes, seventy percent of the subjects could give
no plausible explanation for their judgment. 221 This mirrors Haidt's
results concerning incest.

219. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 42, at 814.
220. Philippa Foot, The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect, 5 OXFORD
REV. 5, 8 (1967).

221. Hauser et al., supra note 131 (manuscript at 20-21). Even the 30 percent who gave what
the authors classed as a "sufficient justification" may have been making purely ex post attempts
at explanation rather than reporting reasoning they used in reaching their conclusion. Id.
(manuscript at 19). The authors used what they called an "extremely liberal criterion": "A
sufficient justification was one that correctly identified any factual difference between the two
scenarios and claimed the difference to be the basis of moral judgment." Id.
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There is at least some degree of consensus that many moral
judgments are made by a deeply intuitive system. Based on his review
of the existing social science literature, Haidt concluded that "moral
222
judgments" derive from "quick automatic evaluations (intuitions)."
Similarly, Hauser concludes that "much of our knowledge of
morality is ... intuitive, based on unconscious and inaccessible
principles... "223 If such judgments were the product of a set of
principles of morality learned from others, it would be a
straightforward matter to derive the "wrongness" of acts from these
principles, just as mathematical inferences can be made from a set of
axioms and subsequently explained by reference to them. "Moral
dumbfounding" and related effects in the psychological literature
suggest that this is not how these judgments are made.
4. Difficulties in Teaching Inarticulable Lessons
Further undermining the social learning explanation for
shared views of justice is the fact that, to the extent that people are
unable to articulate the principles that underlie their intuitions of
justice, it is difficult to transmit those principles verbally to others. In
other words, the intuitional nature of judgments about justice
undermines the argument that they are socially learned through
language. Of course, learning through non-linguistic means is
possible, but the social transmission of information is vastly more
difficult without natural language. The psychological literature is
replete with examples of this general principle, 224 but the general idea
is well illustrated by two relevant phenomena.
First, consider that social transmission is rare in non-humans,
restricted to narrow domains such as song-learning in birds. Without
language, non-human animals are confined to very modest social
learning, so much so that each case of social learning is considered
extraordinary. 225 Second, consider some vivid examples from everyday

222. Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail, supra note 42, at 814, 819-20
(discussing the automaticity of such judgments).
223. HAUSER, supra note 45, at 125. For a recent review of relevant literature, see Cass R.
Sunnstein, Moral Heuristics, 28 BEHAV. & BRAIN ScI. 531, 531-42 (2005).

224. For a recent example, see Bjorn Smtrevik et al., The Utility of Implicit Learning in the
Teaching of Rules, 16 LEARNING & INSTRUCTION 363, 363, 372-73 (2006) (showing that in
teaching rules about chemistry to students, "learning was much more effective when more
explicit ways of teaching were employed").
225. See Michael Tomasello, Culture and Cognitive Development, 9 CURRENT DIRECTIONS
COGNITIVE Sci. 37 (2000) (discussing the human adaptation for cultural transmission of
information, contrasting it with non-humans' capacities, in particular non-human primates); see
also Bennett G. Galef, Jr., The Question of Animal Culture, 3 HUM. NATURE 157, 162 (1992)
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life. The game of "charades" is fun precisely because, deprived of
natural language, conveying simple ideas, even individual words, is
difficult. Similar examples include the difficulty in understanding
what pre-linguistic infants are trying to communicate and asking even
rudimentary questions of someone with whom one does not share a
common language. Social learning without language is not impossible,
but it is certainly difficult. If individual words and simple questions
pose a challenge, consider how much more difficult it would be to
convey abstract, complex notions of deontic principles nonlinguistically. If people do not have explicit access to these principles,
it is unlikely that they are socially transmitted.
In addition to these many failings of the accumulated social
learning explanation, recall that it also suffers the objection raised
with regard to the original "spontaneous social learning" explanation:
that such an explanation depends upon individuals putting group
interests above their individual interests. As noted above, the
available evidence suggests that such altruism has serious limits.
Until it can be shown that there are special circumstances and
reasons that prompt such altruistic behavior, the accumulated social
learning explanation is on this ground as implausible as the
spontaneous social learning explanation.
CONCLUSION
On present evidence, we believe that the explanation for the
"puzzle" of the existence of shared intuitions of justice is more likely a
specific evolved human mechanism for acquiring these core intuitions
than general social learning derived from some set of conditions and
life experiences universal to all humans and all human groups. The
latter cannot be ruled out on present evidence, but it seems
implausible, while the former is consistent with all available data.
Whichever conclusion one prefers, important implications
follow. Shared intuitions of justice are not easily altered, regardless of
their source. Even if the source is general social learning, it must be
social learning arising only from an aspect of human life experience
that is so fundamental as to be essentially universal to all persons
without regard to circumstances or culture. In other words, it is not a
source that is open to easy change or manipulation. If it were not so
fixed, if it were easily manipulable, then the natural variations in

(arguing that non-human animals do not imitate one another in a way that closely parallels
human imitation, looking in detail at two of the most prominent cases of putative non-human
cultural transmission).
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circumstance and culture would have altered it and produced
variations in intuitions of justice; there would not be the agreement
that exists.
226
While a full account of these implications is another project,
consider the possibilities. For example, it may be unrealistic to expect
the population to "rise above" its desire to punish wrongdoers and to
expect the government to "re-educate" people away from their interest
in punishing wrongdoers, as is urged by some reformers. It is unlikely
that the shared intuition that serious wrongdoing should be punished
can be changed through social engineering, at least not through
methods short of the kind of coercive indoctrination that liberal
democracies find unacceptable.
For another example, a criminal justice system that regularly
fails to do justice or that regularly does injustice, as judged by shared
intuitions of justice, will risk a great deal. It will inevitably be seen as
failing in a mission thought important, even foundational, by the
community-unless the system can hide its unjust operation. That
would be hard to accomplish without breaching notions of press
freedom and government transparency to which liberal democracies
aspire.
As a final example, any realistic criminal justice system or
program for its reform must acknowledge and engage the community's
shared intuitions of justice. This does not mean that law can never
deviate from those intuitions or try to change them. There is nothing
sacred or immutable about our current intuitions of justice. But a
criminal justice system must be realistic about how different kinds of
changes may require different-and sometimes high-financial and
social costs. The greatest success in shaping the perceived
wrongfulness of particular conduct might not be to fight people's
intuitions of justice, but to try to harness them, by providing
information or arguments that strengthen (or weaken) the analogy
between the target conduct and the core wrongdoing on which people
have strong intuitions.

226. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley., Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal
Law and Justice Policy, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (focusing on common intuitions of
justice and injustice and examining their implications on the efficacy of criminal systems and
reform movements).

